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EXTRALEGAL SUPREME COURT POLICY-MAKING
Joëlle Anne Moreno*
The Colbert Report aired its final episode on December 18, 2014.1 Nine years
earlier, on the first episode, Stephen Colbert coined the word “truthiness.”2 Truthiness
satirized contemporary disinterest in empirical information in a country increasingly
“divided between those who think with their head and those who know with their
heart.”3 Truthiness was not just the Merriam-Webster word of the year.4 Over the past
decade, it has been the unspoken mantra of reporters who give equal time to climate
science denialists, faith healers, and vaccine refusers.5 When Justices of the Supreme
Court decide questions of scientific or empirical fact—such as whether an IUD pre-
vents or terminates a pregnancy—they increasingly employ fact-finding strategies
that equate the empirical evidence (they think with their heads) with the unsubstanti-
ated beliefs (they feel with their hearts).6 Jurisprudential epistemic relativism (or
* Associate Dean for Faculty Development & Professor of Law, Florida International
University College of Law.
1 The Colbert Report: Sign Off—From Eternity (Comedy Central television broadcast
Dec. 18, 2014), http://thecolbertreport.cc.com/videos/p2s8rc/sign-off---from-eternity.
2 The Colbert Report: The Word—Truthiness (Comedy Central television broadcast
Oct. 17, 2005), http://thecolbertreport.cc.com/videos/63ite2/the-word---truthiness.
3 Id.
4 2006 Word of the Year, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, http://www.merriam-webster.com/word
-of-the-year/2006-word-of-the-year.htm [http://perma.cc/N2GB-5AFF] (naming “truthiness”
Merriam-Webster’s number one Word of the Year for 2006).
5 See Chris Mooney & Matthew C. Nisbet, Undoing Darwin, COLUM. JOURNALISM REV.,
Sept.–Oct. 2005, http://www.math.wichita.edu/~pparker/personal/mooney_asp.html [http://
perma.cc/HM3K-C5SM] (describing how “an entirely lopsided debate within the scientific
community” can be “transformed into an evenly divided one in the popular arena”). However,
there is evidence of more recent backlash to balanced media coverage of some science policy
debates. In Another Outbreak of False Balance, New York Times reporter Margaret Sullivan
described increased reader frustration with false balance “on the subjects of teaching evolution
[and] the reality of climate change” because the media practice of giving “equal weight to
both sides . . . [does not] clearly acknowledge established truths.” Margaret Sullivan, Opinion,
Another Outbreak of “False Balance”?, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 7, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com
/2015/02/08/opinion/sunday/another-outbreak-of-false-balance.html.
6 Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2759 (2014) (upholding the
right of three closely held corporations to refuse to provide health-insurance coverage for
methods of contraception under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 (RFRA), 107
Stat. 1488, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb–200066-4, based—not on the medical evidence—but solely
on their “beliefs the four contraceptive methods at issue are abortifacients”); see also
Tummino v. Hamburg, 936 F. Supp. 2d 162, 164–65 (E.D.N.Y. 2013) (finding that Plan B
emergency contraception “interferes with prefertilization events” and has “not been shown
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truthiness) often produces the wrong answer to questions of fact. Issues of law and
natural science or human behavior shape many Supreme Court cases, including impor-
tant recent decisions on death by lethal drug cocktail7 and the psychological benefits
of marriage for same-sex families.8 At the micro level, decisions that contradict the
to cause a postfertilization event—a change in the uterus that could interfere with implantation
of a fertilized egg”).
7 On June 29, 2015, in Glossip v. Gross, 135 S. Ct. 2726 (2015), the Supreme Court
ruled that Oklahoma’s lethal injection protocol does not violate the Eighth Amendment.
Justice Alito, writing for the majority, affirmed the district court’s finding of fact that the
drug “midazolam is highly likely to render a person unable to feel pain during an execution.”
Id. at 2739. Although the majority cautioned that “federal courts should not ‘embroil [them-
selves] in ongoing scientific controversies beyond their expertise,’” id. at 2740 (alteration
in original) (quoting Baze v. Ky. Dep’t of Corr., 128 S. Ct. 1520, 1531 (2008)), the Court
relied upon the finding that “a 500-milligram dose of midazolam would make it a ‘virtual
certainty’ that any individual would be ‘at a sufficient level of unconsciousness to resist the
noxious stimuli which could occur from application of the . . . [additional] drugs’ used in the
Oklahoma protocol,” id. at 2741 (quoting app. 302). The Court also specifically rejected cri-
tique of this factual finding based on the expert’s own admission “that his findings were based
on ‘extrapolat[ions]’ from studies done about much lower therapeutic doses of midazolam.”
Id. (alteration in original). In addition, Justice Alito rejected the scientific argument that
midazolam’s “ceiling effect” makes it unlikely that the dose administered in Oklahoma would
make an inmate insensate to pain. Id. (quoting app. 243). Writing in dissent, Justice Sotomayor
made very different findings of medical fact. She noted that three experts had “agreed that
midazolam is from a class of sedative drugs known as benzodiazepines (a class that includes
Valium and Xanax), and that it has no analgesic—or pain-relieving—effects.” Id. at 2783
(Sotomayor, J., dissenting). Critical scientific testimony, in the dissenters’ view was provided
by Dr. Lubarsky who opined that
this ceiling on midazolam’s sedative effect is reached before full anes-
thesia can be achieved. . . . [So] while ‘midazolam unconsciousness
is . . . sufficient’ for ‘minor procedure[s],’ it is incapable of keeping some-
one ‘insensate and immobile in the face of [more] noxious stimuli,’ in-
cluding the extreme pain and discomfort associated with administration
of the . . . [additional] drugs in Oklahoma’s lethal injection protocol.
Id. at 2783 (second, third, and fourth alterations in original) (citations omitted). According
to Justice Sotomayor, these findings have significant evidentiary weight because they are
based on medical studies and pharmacology textbooks, rather than unsupported speculation.
Id. Finally, the dissenters objected to the fact that “the Court sweeps aside substantial evidence
showing that, while midazolam may be able to induce unconsciousness, it cannot be utilized
to maintain unconsciousness in the face of agonizing stimuli . . . [and] finds comfort in Dr.
Evans’ wholly unsupported claims that 500 milligrams of midazolam will ‘paralyz[e] the
brain.’” Id. at 2785–86 (third alteration in original); see also Baze v. Rees, 553 U.S. 35
(2008) (upholding the constitutionality of Kentucky’s lethal injection protocol and holding
that any challenge to lethal injection must include a showing that a state’s drug protocol pre-
sents a “substantial” or “objectively intolerable” risk of serious harm).
8 On June 26, 2015, in Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015), the Supreme Court
held that the Fourteenth Amendment requires every state to issue a marriage license to same-
sex couples. According to Justice Kennedy, who wrote for the majority, marriage arises “from
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empirical evidence are inaccurate and unfair to the parties. At the macro level, when
judges balance substantiated data against truthiness-based claims, courts distort social
perceptions by creating a false epistemic relativism that models poor decision-making
and yields bad public policy.
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the most basic human needs” and “is essential to our most profound hopes and aspirations.”
Id. at 2594. The Court’s fact-finding about the psychological importance of marriage in-
cludes the majority’s endorsement of the conclusion that “[c]hoices about marriage shape an
individual’s destiny . . . because ‘it fulfils yearnings for security, safe haven, and connection
that express our common humanity, civil marriage is an esteemed institution, and the decision
whether and whom to marry is among life’s momentous acts of self-definition.’” Id. at 2559
(quoting Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 955 (Mass. 2003)). Marriage
is, in the Court’s view, “a coming together for better or for worse, hopefully enduring, and
intimate to the degree of being sacred. It is an association that promotes a way of life, not
causes; a harmony in living, not political faiths; a bilateral loyalty, not commercial or social
projects.” Id. (quoting Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 486 (1965)). Through the
“enduring bond” of marriage, “two persons together can find other freedoms, such as expres-
sion, intimacy, and spirituality.” Id. Finally, the Court engaged in fact-finding about the positive
psychological benefits parental marriage confers on children. “By giving recognition and legal
structure to their parents’ relationship, marriage allows children ‘to understand the integrity
and closeness of their own family and its concord with other families in their community and
in their daily lives’ . . . [and] affords the permanency and stability important to children’s best
interests.” Id. at 2600 (quoting Windsor v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2694–95 (2013)).
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INTRODUCTION
The Supreme Court routinely explores the science of nature while ignoring the
nature of science. A half century ago, Justice Stewart claimed to know pornography
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when he saw it,9 but the modern Supreme Court believes that real science is equally
easy to spot. As society becomes more science dependent, the Justices increasingly
opine on critical public policy questions ranging from global climate change10 to the
social benefits of a racially diverse college campus,11 to the most intimate psycho-
logical and medical details of birth control12 and abortion.13
Decisions about natural or social science are extralegal. They do not involve
“judging,” because members of the Court cannot rely on jurisprudential acumen or
familiar methods of legal interpretation. Questions about the natural world and human
behavior also invariably involve fact-finding beyond the individual circumstances
of a particular case. They differ from questions about the law because they do not in-
volve interpretation of legal sources, but instead must be answered with what Justice
Brandeis famously referred to as “general facts.”14 Kenneth Culp Davis, describing
the same predicate extralegal information, coined the term “legislative facts,”15 be-
cause in his view these facts “inform[] a court’s legislative judgment on questions of
law and policy.”16
Extralegal decisions set and alter public policy. In her recent work, Professor
Allison Orr Larsen described the Supreme Court’s increased reliance on legislative
facts outside the pleadings and amicus briefs, opining that a “plausible explanation
for this shift is that the change in access to information has increased judicial reli-
ance on legislative facts, period.”17 Professor Larsen’s trend spotting is well sup-
ported by her empirical research, but judges have always engaged in policy-making
about the natural world and human behavior. Throughout history, courts have en-
gaged in extralegal fact-finding. “[I]t only makes sense to provide courts with data
to assist in their law-making function if one sees courts as having such a function, as
distinguished from a function of discovering law that is dictated by text, precedent,
and principle.”18
9 Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring).
10 Util. Air Regulatory Grp. v. EPA, 134 S. Ct. 2427 (2014); see also Massachusetts v.
EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 528 (2007) (rejecting the EPA’s argument that the Clean Air Act is not
applicable to carbon fuel emissions and the link between emissions and global climate change).
11 Schuette v. BAMN, 134 S. Ct. 1623 (2014); see also Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin,
133 S. Ct. 2411 (2012).
12 Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014).
13 Id.
14 Ann Woolhandler, Rethinking the Judicial Reception of Legislative Facts, 41 VAND.
L. REV. 111, 115 (1988).
15 Kenneth Culp Davis, An Approach to Problems of Evidence in the Administrative Process,
55 HARV. L. REV. 364, 407 (1942).
16 Id. at 404.
17 Allison Orr Larsen, Confronting Supreme Court Fact Finding, 98 VA. L. REV. 1255,
1308 (2012).
18 Woolhandler, supra note 14, at 115; see also Larsen, supra note 17, at 1267 (noting
that “[l]egislative facts can be—but do not have to be—the subject of expert testimony in the
trial court”).
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A. Judicial Fact-Finding
Unfortunately, judges are not especially skilled fact finders. There is “no good rea-
son to conclude that, by virtue of qualities, training, or experience . . . [that] judges
should be considered experts at weighing evidence or at fact-finding.”19 Judging, un-
like policy-making, almost never requires the assessment of competing factual claims,
data analysis, or evaluations of critiques of settled natural or social science. Even in
bench trials where judges act as “finders of fact,” their purview is restricted to the spe-
cific “adjudicative facts” necessary to the resolution of the pending legal question.20
Concerns about judicial aptitude are compounded by the fact that the essential
methodology of accurate fact-finding must be evidence-based and transparent.
Decision-making about the world requires open access to information because trans-
parency enables other researchers to identify errors and make improvements. In The
Wisdom of Crowds, James Surowiecki explained the importance of transparency to
optimizing accuracy, using the example of the discovery of the SARS virus, a seri-
ous form of pneumonia first identified in 1993.21
The discovery of the SARS virus was, by any measure, a remark-
able feat. And when we’re faced with a remarkable feat, our nat-
ural inclination is to ask: Who did it? Who actually discovered
the cause of SARS? But the truth is, that’s an impossible question
to answer. We know the name of the person who first spotted the
coronavirus. She was an electron microscopist named Cynthia
Goldsmith, who worked in the Centers for Disease Control and
Prevention lab in Atlanta. But you can’t say she discovered what
caused SARS, since it took weeks of work by labs all over the
world to prove that the coronavirus actually made people sick.22
Scientific inquiry, like law, is a fact-finding social enterprise conducted by human
investigators. Although obviously imperfect, the sine qua non of all legitimate in-
quiry is integrity. Professor Susan Haack concisely defined “scientific integrity” as
“the epistemological values of evidence-sharing and respect for evidence.”23 When
19 Barbara A. Spellman, On the Supposed Expertise of Judges in Evaluating Evidence,
156 U. PA. L. REV. 6–7 (2007).
20 Woolhandler, supra note 14, at 113–14 (defining case-specific “adjudicative facts” as
facts about what the parties did, what the circumstances were, and what the background con-
ditions were).
21 JAMES SUROWIECKI, THE WISDOM OF CROWDS 160 (2004).
22 Id. (describing how every lab involved in the project shared data with all other labs
every morning).
23 Susan Haack, The Integrity of Science: What it Means, Why it Matters, 11 COLECCAO
BIOETICA 9, 10 (2006) (Port.), http://www.cnecv.pt/admin/files/data/docs/1415203323_Livro
%20bioetica_11_etica%20e%20investigaco.pdf [http://perma.cc/B9M7-2AD2].
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Justices select information from amicus briefs24 or other disclosed or undisclosed
outside sources25 to answer empirical questions, these same epistemological values
should guide their analyses. When courts balance pseudoscientific claims against
sound scientific explanations, they endorse a false epistemic relativism that lacks sci-
entific integrity by failing to respect the evidence.
Judicial fact-finding is traditionally opaque. During confirmation hearings,
nominated Justices increasingly stonewall, arguing that any response would “under-
mine the impartiality of the judiciary.”26 Once on the Court, the Justices remain secre-
tive about their decision-making methods even in cases of significant public import
and long after decisions have been issued.27 Following a December 2014 investigation
of Supreme Court secrecy in a range of significant cases, New Yorker reporter Jill
Lepore concluded, “[T]here’s no reason to believe that historians will ever really know
how the Court arrived at these decisions.”28 The fact that the Supreme Court—the least
democratic branch—regularly engages in policy-making has been a topic of significant
long-standing interest and debate, inside and outside the legal academy.29 But testing
the accuracy of opaque Supreme Court decisions is difficult because “reliable feed-
back as to the appropriate weighing of evidence does not exist—[so] the ground truth
of cases is never known.”30
24 Allison Orr Larsen, The Trouble with Amicus Facts, 100 VA. L. REV. 1757, 1758 (2014)
(noting that “[a]micus curiae briefs filed at the U.S. Supreme Court are on the rise—up 800%
over 50 years” and that “the most influential type of amicus brief . . . is one that adds new facts
to the record”).
25 In her excellent article, Confronting Supreme Court Fact Finding, Professor Allison Orr
Larsen demonstrates that in the Supreme Court, “in the last decade or so, questions of legisla-
tive fact are being researched ‘in house’—that is, without reliance on the parties or amici—at
an astonishing rate.” See Larsen, supra note 17, at 1262.
26 Erwin Chemerinsky, Making Confirmation Hearings Meaningful, YALE L.J. (THE
POCKET PART), Jan. 2006, http://yalelawjournal.org/forum/making-confirmation-hearings
-meaningful [http://perma.cc/AW6Q-KPXS] (noting that “[t]his was John Roberts’s repeated
answer to questions throughout his confirmation hearings and it followed the pattern of recent
nominees who refused to answer anything that might give an inkling as to how the nominee
might vote on specific issues”).
27 See, e.g., Jill Lepore, The Great Paper Caper, NEW YORKER (Dec. 1, 2014), http://www
.newyorker.com/magazine/2014/12/01/great-paper-caper [http://perma.cc/6RZ3-WMCV].
28 Id.
29 See, e.g., David E. Wilkins, The “Actual State of Things”: Teaching About Law in
Political and Historical Context, 82 N.D. L. REV. 903, 912 (2006) (noting that the Supreme
Court “is first and most fundamentally a profoundly political institution and crafts important
policy pronouncements, otherwise known as judicial opinions, as one of three co-equal branches
of government”); see also Eric Black, How the Supreme Court Has Come to Play a Policymak-
ing Role, MINNPOST (Nov. 20, 2012), https://www.minnpost.com/eric-black-ink/2012/11/how
-supreme-court-has-come-play-policymaking-role [http://perma.cc/E562-W6J4] (“When they
impose their policy preferences in the guise of defending the Constitution—or even when they
are perceived to be doing so—the credibility of the whole system takes a hit.”).
30 Spellman, supra note 19, at 7 (describing why judges are rarely experts at assessing
empirical evidence).
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Given the investigative constraints, it is tempting to simply conclude that the
Justices advance favored policy objectives. This explanation would add to the cacoph-
ony of speculation about the Court’s uncertain legitimacy.31 In many cases these fears
are warranted. The Court is not immune to front-page science-policy controversies32—
even when partisan debates do not divide neatly along party lines.33 But, in other cases,
well-intentioned Justices seeking accurate information about how the world works
may find it increasingly difficult to distinguish science from its counterfeits.34
B. Modern Epistemic Relativism: The Anti-Evolution and Anti-Abortion Debates
Epistemic relativism equating scientific facts with faith is at least as old as Galileo’s
heliocentrism debate with Pope Urban VII in the early 1600s.35 Four centuries later,
31 See, e.g., James L. Gibson & Michael J. Nelson, The Legitimacy of the US Supreme
Court: Conventional Wisdom and Recent Challenges Thereto, 10 ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI.
201 (2014); Eric Segall, Supreme Court Puts Its Legitimacy at Risk, CNN (May 12, 2014,
2:09 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2014/05/12/opinion/segall-supreme-court-political [http://
perma.cc/MR6Q-56J3].
32 Jeremy W. Peters & Richard Pérez-Peña, Measles Proves Delicate Issue to G.O.P. Field,
N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 3, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/02/03/us/politics/measles-proves
-delicate-issue-to-gop-field.html?_r=0 (noting that “[t]he vaccination controversy is a twist
on an old problem for the Republican Party: how to approach matters that have largely been
settled among scientists but are not widely accepted by conservatives,” that politicians “hedge
their answers about whether evolution should be taught in schools,” and that “the fight over
global warming [is] . . . a liability” for politicians who deny climate change).
33 Id. (“The debate does not break entirely along right-left lines. The movement to forgo
vaccinations has been popular in more liberal and affluent communities where some parents
are worried that vaccines cause autism or other disorders among children.”).
34 These problems are compounded by the advent of organizations like the American
Association of Physicians and Surgeons (AAPS). AAPS, which regularly files amicus briefs
and appears to be a medical organization, is instead a partisan group advancing a political
“agenda [that] opposes government intervention in medical practice,” which takes public po-
sitions “at odds with mainstream medical organizations . . . on childhood vaccines” and other
science policy questions. See Jeremy W. Peters & Barry Meier, Paul Is Linked to Group of
Doctors Supporting Vaccination Challenges, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 4, 2015), http://www.nytimes
.com/2015/02/05/us/politics/rand-paul-linked-to-association-of-american-physicians-and
-surgeons.html.
35 For a very interesting summary of the life and work of Galileo Galilei (1564–1642),
see Albert Van Helden & Elizabeth Burr, The Galileo Project, GALILEO PROJECT, http://galileo
.rice.edu [http://perma.cc/R2BJ-9QWR] (last updated 1995). In brief, it was Galileo’s vocal
advocacy of the Copernican proposition that the sun is located at the center of the universe that
aroused the ire of the Catholic Church and the perception that these ideas were heresy that
made him an Inquisition target. Galileo was warned by Cardinal Bellarmine (under order of
Pope Paul V), that he should not advance Copernican theories. See Galileo Timeline, GALILEO
PROJECT, http://galileo.rice.edu/chron/galileo.html [http://perma.cc/UP8F-EXBB]. Galileo was
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instant internet access to pseudoscientific misinformation has been a game changer.36
But the modern Supreme Court bears significant responsibility for further distorting
many current science policy debates and for adding its imprimatur of legitimacy to
specious empirical claims.
Edwards v. Aguillard,37 the contemporary Court’s seminal examination of science
and science policy, involved a Louisiana statute requiring public schools to provide
equal time for “Creation Science.”38 Justice Brennan, who wrote for the Edwards
majority, had little trouble concluding that Creation Science was religion because it
was a transparent effort “to restructure the science curriculum to conform to a par-
ticular religious viewpoint.”39 But the Court notably failed to decide whether Crea-
tion Science was—or could be—science.40 By focusing all of its attention on the
“creation” of Creation Science,41 and none on the “science,”42 Justice Brennan elided
called to Rome in 1633 to face the Inquisition, found guilty of heresy, and spent the remainder
of his life under house arrest. See id.
36 See, e.g., Milton Rothman, Pseudoscience on the Internet, SKEPTICAL INQUIRER (Dec.
1996), http://www.csicop.org/sb/show/pseudoscience_on_the_internet/ [http://perma.cc/3N7M
-SCJY]; see also Trine Tsouderos & Robert Goldberg, Avoiding Internet Pseudoscience:
Live Health Chat, CHI. TRIB. (Apr. 19, 2011, 12:00 PM), http://www.chicagotribune.com
/lifestyles/health/ct-health-chat-pseudoscience-htmlstory.html.
37 482 U.S. 578 (1987).
38 Id. at 591.
39 Id. at 593. The Edwards Court relied on the three-pronged Lemon test, which requires
that: (1) the legislature had a secular purpose when it adopted the statute; (2) the statute’s pri-
mary effect does not inhibit or advance religion; and (3) the statute does not create excessive
entanglement between government and religion to hold that the Louisiana law ran afoul of the
Establishment Clause. Id. at 585, 597; see Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612–23 (1971).
40 The district court had also been disinclined to address the issue of the “science” of Creation
Science. See Aguillard v. Treen, 634 F. Supp. 426 (E.D. La. 1985) (granting summary judg-
ment on Establishment Clause grounds).
41 The Edwards Court held that the state law was unconstitutional, because “[t]he preem-
inent purpose of the Louisiana Legislature was clearly to advance the religious viewpoint that
a supernatural being created humankind” and to “advance[ ] a religious doctrine by requiring
either the banishment of the theory of evolution from public school classrooms or the presen-
tation of a religious viewpoint that rejects evolution in its entirety.” 482 U.S. at 591, 596
(emphasis added).
42 Journalist Margaret Talbot has speculated that judges rarely endeavor to explore the
science of evolution because they are “reluctant to engage in the heady question of what con-
stitutes science” and perhaps more to the point “few working scientists have been willing to
testify against evolutionary theory.” Margaret Talbot, Darwin in the Dock, NEW YORKER,
Dec. 5, 2005, at 66. However, it was certainly possible for a mid-1980s court to address these
epistemological matters. In fact, just five years before Aguillard, a federal district court in
McLean v. Arkansas Board of Education, 529 F. Supp. 1255 (E.D. Ark. 1982), faced with
a similar “Balanced Treatment for Creation-Science and Evolution-Science Act,” had held
that the law “lacks legitimate educational value because ‘creation science’ . . . is simply not
science.” Id. at 1267 (emphasis added).
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the epistemological questions at the heart of the vitriolic policy debate.43 But, toward
the end of the opinion, the majority included an open invitation to future evolution
opponents.44 Unconstitutional efforts to seek equal classroom time for “Creation
Science” could be replaced with new laws “requir[ing] that scientific critiques of
prevailing scientific theories be taught.”45 Justice Scalia, who had joined the Court
the previous fall, used his dissent to elaborate his view that Creation Science had
already established itself as “scientific” theory and critique, because it relied on a
“body of scientific evidence supporting creation science [that] is as strong as that
supporting evolution.”46
The Edwards Court redefined “scientific critique” as a critique of science, rather
than a critique based in science. Five years later, by the time the Supreme Court first
addressed the epistemology of science in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals,
Inc.,47 the anti-evolution movement was already following Justice Brennan’s advice.
It was abandoning its religious rhetoric and embracing a new “scientized” approach.
Rebranding Creation Science as Intelligent Design48 signaled evolution opponents’
new effort to “carefully distinguish themselves from creation scientists . . . [and] use
only the language of science.”49 This strategy would transform the public and legal
debate from a religious quest to a seemingly scientific disagreement over competing
explanations and evidentiary uncertainty.
Over the last decade of the twentieth century, Edwards would catalyze copycat
legal policy shifts in the anti-abortion movement. A comparison of origins and effects
43 Legal philosopher Susan Haack offers the following concise definition of core
epistemology of science questions:
The core epistemological values of science are rooted in the central,
defining concern of inquiry generally: finding things out. A scientific
inquirer starts with a question about what might explain this or that nat-
ural or social phenomenon; makes an informed guess; and assesses how
well his conjecture stands up to whatever evidence is already available,
or can be obtained: i.e., how firmly it is anchored in experimental results
and experiential evidence generally; how well it interlocks with the whole
explanatory mesh of the body of thus-far well-warranted claims and
theories; whether relevant evidence might have been overlooked; and
what else could be done to get hold of evidence not presently available.
Haack, supra note 23, at 11.
44 Edwards, 482 U.S. at 593.
45 Id.
46 Id. at 623 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
47 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
48 Robert T. Pennock, Creation-Science and Intelligent Design: Different Names for
Religious Theory, U.S. NEWS (Feb. 10, 2009, 2:14 PM), http://www.usnews.com/opinion/arti
cles/2009/02/10/creation-science-and-intelligent-design-different-names-for-religious-theory
[http://perma.cc/7UWC-N29Z] (“Following the Supreme Court decision [in Edwards] in 1987,
creationists regrouped and rebranded their views as ‘Intelligent Design (ID) Theory.’”).
49 See Mooney & Nisbet, supra note 5.
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of the anti-evolution and anti-abortion movements is inexplicably absent from the
legal literature. But these dual social and public policy movements, with their con-
temporaneous trajectories, overlapping constituencies, and near-identical legal strat-
egies, offer significant insight into modern extralegal Supreme Court policy-making.
Edwards’s definition of “scientific critique” continues to shape current cases. Just
last year in Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., the Supreme Court changed health
law policy under Obamacare by advancing the scientific-sounding argument that four
forms of contraception (two Plan “B” emergency pills and two types of IUDs) are
abortifacients.50 Although the specific question before the Court involved corporate
religious “beliefs” under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993,51 the major-
ity ignored an extensive record of evidence-based medicine, establishing that these
birth control methods prevent, but do not terminate, a pregnancy.52 As the Court con-
fronts new and more complex questions about the natural world and human behavior,
these decisions should not be based on “facts” the Justices “know with their hearts.”53
Edwards’s effects are present, but less obvious, in other current science and law
controversies. For example, measles infected millions of Americans before vaccines
became widely available in 1963, and four to five hundred people died of the disease
each year.54 In 2000, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) announced
that measles had been eradicated from the United States because a year had passed
without a single transmission of the disease.55 More recently, as pseudoscientific fears
about childhood vaccines and autism continue to increase, measles has returned.56 The
problem of unvaccinated children is generally blamed on state legislatures, who are
50 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2762–63 (2014).
51 Id. at 2759.
52 Brief for Physicians for Reproductive Health et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners,
Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2751 (No. 13-354), 2013 WL 5740263 (“[T]here is a scientific dis-
tinction between a contraceptive and an abortifacient and the scientific record demonstrates
that none of the FDA-approved contraceptives covered by the Mandate are abortifacients.”).
53 The fact that the Court engages in policy-making regularly attracts the attention of
commentators inside the legal academy, see, e.g., Wilkins, supra note 29, at 912 (noting that
the Supreme Court “is first and most fundamentally a profoundly political institution and crafts
important policy pronouncements, otherwise known as judicial opinions, as one of three co-
equal branches of government”), and outside, see, e.g., Black, supra note 29 (“When they
impose their policy preferences in the guise of defending the Constitution—or even when they
are perceived to be doing so—the credibility of the whole system takes a hit.”).
54 Frank Bruni, Opinion, The Vaccine Lunacy: Disneyland, Measles and Madness, N.Y.
TIMES (Jan. 31, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/02/01/opinion/sunday/frank-bruni-disney
land-measles-and-madness.html.
55 Measles History, CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, http://www.cdc.gov
/measles/about/history.html#elimination [http://perma.cc/33HJ-JE8T] (“Measles was declared
eliminated (absence of continuous disease transmission for greater than 12 months) from the
United States in 2000.”).
56 See Bruni, supra note 54.
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responsible for the recent proliferation of school vaccine exemptions.57 But the
Supreme Court played an important, if unrecognized, role. In 2011, in Bruesewitz v.
Wyeth LLC,58 the Court addressed claims made by parents alleging that vaccines had
harmed their children. Although the specific question before the Court involved pre-
emption of civil lawsuits by the National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act, the case arose
against a backdrop of thousands of pending autism injury claims.59 The Bruesewitz
majority ignored this factual context, failing to even mention the extensive empirical
evidence disproving a causal connection between vaccines and autism.60 In fact, Jus-
tice Sotomayor added fuel to the anti-vaccine fire by specifically suggesting that in-
jury claims have presumptive scientific merit.61 Four years later, after nearly 650 new
measles transmissions in 2014, the CDC had retracted its finding that measles had
been eradicated.62 The 2014 Disneyland outbreak63 caused the CDC to project even
higher measles transmission rates for 2015.64
C. Why and How: The Goals and Roadmap
The goal of this Article is to expose and compare the origins and effects of the
anti-evolution and anti-abortion movements on extralegal Supreme Court policy-
making about the natural world and human behavior. Any analysis of science, science
57 Id.; Meghan Hoyer & Steven Reilly, Low Vaccination Rates at Schools Put Students at
Risk, USA TODAY (Feb. 24, 2015, 11:54 AM), http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/2015/02
/04/schoolvaccinationrates/22840549 [http://perma.cc/C2PR-G6WG] (as of 2015, nearly 50%
of public schools students in some cities are unvaccinated); Saad B. Omer, Opinion, How to
Handle the Vaccine Skeptics, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 6, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015
/02/06/opinion/how-to-handle-the-vaccine-skeptics.html?_r=0 (noting that thirty-one pro-
posed bills introduced between 2009 and 2012 were aimed at making vaccine exemptions
easier to obtain and that most exemptions are based on “misplaced skepticism [that] is not
really principled but premised, rather, on false notions like that of a link between autism and
the measles vaccine”).
58 562 U.S. 223 (2011).
59 Id.
60 See id.
61 In fact, Justice Sotomayor, who was joined by Justice Ginsburg in her dissent, opined
that if civil suits were not preempted, “the possibility of a torrent of meritless lawsuits bank-
rupting manufacturers and causing vaccine shortages seems remote at best.” Id. at 1101 n.25
(Sotomayor, J., dissenting). Because the Act at issue was created to address autism injury
claims (along with other injury claims), the dissenters were clearly aware of the thousands of
lawsuits pending against vaccine manufacturers for autism-related claims, suggesting that
Justices Sotomayor and Ginsburg believe these cases have scientific “merit.” See id.
62 See Bruni, supra note 54.
63 Mike Stobbe, US Measles Count Rises to 121; Most Linked to Disneyland, ASSOCIATED
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policy, and law presents questions of theory and practice. This Article, which is the
first of a two-part project,65 addresses the theoretical question: How did we get here?
The methodology is to trace the effective post-Edwards deployment of empirically
unwarranted “scientific theories” and “scientific critiques.” This research demonstrates
that for the last two decades of the twentieth century, the anti-abortion movement
tracked the anti-evolution movement.66 Starting in the twenty-first century, the anti-
abortion movement has achieved significant legal and extralegal success with “scien-
tized” arguments involving “partial-birth abortion,”67 “post-abortion trauma,”68 and the
medical risks of nonhospital abortion procedures.69 A decade after Kitzmiller v. Dover
Area School District70 rejected anti-evolutionists’ scientific claims, Intelligent Design
has retained or regained public traction with 2014 Gallup polls revealing that 31%
of Americans believe in Intelligent Design and 44% believe in Creationism and new
research indicating that Intelligent Design sponsored “scientific critique” is reenter-
ing our public schools.71
This Article proceeds in four parts. Part I explains the problem of evidence
hegemony on questions of science and law. Part II examines the distorting impact of
seminal science education cases on the judicial epistemology of science. Part III ex-
plores the advent of pseudoscientific anti-evolution and anti-abortion strategies inside
and outside the courts. Part IV analyzes divergent twentieth-century developments.
Finally, the conclusion incorporates decision-making insights from communications,
behavior economics, and cognitive science. Ex ante, these insights could improve
65 In a forthcoming article, I tackle the practical implications with a systematic review
of extralegal judicial fact-finding in all Supreme Court cases involving natural and social
science over the past five terms.
66 See infra Part III.
67 See infra Part III.B.
68 See infra Part III.A.2.
69 See State Policies in Brief: An Overview of Abortion Laws, GUTTMACHER INST. (Nov. 1,
2015), http://www.guttmacher.org/statecenter/spibs/spib_OAL.pdf?wptouch_preview_theme=
enabled [http://perma.cc/6Q64-HMWV]. As of November 1, 2015, most current and pending
abortion restrictions purport to advance natural/medical science interests by: (1) requiring
abortions to be performed by a licensed physician; (2) in a hospital; (3) with the involvement
of a second physician; or (4) only to protect the woman’s life or health. Id. Additionally,
some states purport to advance social science/psychological interests by mandating pre-abortion
counseling on: (1) the purported link between abortion and breast cancer; (2) fetal pain; and/or
(3) maternal mental health consequences. Id.
70 400 F. Supp. 2d 707 (M.D. Pa. 2005).
71 See Emma Green, Intelligent Design: Slowly Going out of Style?, ATLANTIC (June 9,
2014, 4:11 PM), http://www.theatlantic.com/national/archive/2014/06/intelligent-design-slowly
-going-out-of-style/372454/ [http://perma.cc/NX5V-JEZZ] (noting that a 2014 Gallup poll
found that only 19% of Americans said they believe in evolution, while 31% said they believe
in Intelligent Design and 44% said they believe in Creationism); see also Jon D. Miller et al.,
Science Communication: Public Acceptance of Evolution, 313 SCIENCE 765 (2006) (finding
that 40% of surveyed Americans accept the idea of evolution).
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judicial decisions by increasing accuracy and transparency. Ex post, they could inform
new transdisciplinary72 analyses of science, science policy, and law.
D. Two Disclaimers
First, in this Article, the bulk of the “science v. faith” questions will be relegated
to the theologians and philosophers.73 Perhaps religion is itself a type of adaptation
by groups of people, as David Sloan Wilson has posited.74 Evolution may be the only
possible explanation for the natural world, as Richard Dawkins believes.75 It is, of
course, impossible to falsify Francis S. Collins’s “big tent” hypothesis that God ini-
tiated the Big Bang.76 In any event, believe whatever you like, these fascinating ques-
tions are far beyond the scope of this Article.
Second, the Article acknowledges, but will not answer, Linda Greenhouse’s
concern that the current Supreme Court has devolved into “a collection of politicians
in robes.”77 The Justices may be politicians. Undoubtedly they are politically savvy,
72 Although most legal commentators speak of interdisciplinarity, a transdisciplinary
approach differs by connoting that the problems of science and law are not limited to the two
fields. Contemporary media theorist Nolan Bazinet offers the following helpful explanation
of the definitional distinction:
A denotative analysis of the prefix ‘inter-’ in any online dictionary leads
us to a list of synonyms among which ‘between’, ‘among’, ‘mutually’,
‘reciprocally’, and ‘together’ appear. The prefix ‘trans-’, however, reveals
synonyms such as ‘across’, ‘beyond’ and ‘through’. Both lists of syn-
onyms are similar but are also different in very important ways. Inter- has
the connotations of ‘cooperation’ and ‘reciprocity’, whereas trans- can
be said to have a connotation of ‘beyond the known limits.’
Nolan Bazinet, Inter-Disciplinary or Trans-Disciplinary?, ALAN-SHAPIRO.COM (June 13,
2012), http://www.alan-shapiro.com/inter-disciplinary-or-trans-disciplinary-by-nolan-bazinet/
[http://perma.cc/K23N-8V8U].
73 As Professor Susan Haack has noted, the evaluation of scientists and science inevitably
involves some sort of epistemological inquiry:
When we ask about the integrity of the scientist, however, the primary
concern is likely to be his adherence to epistemological values; for
inquiry, investigation, is the defining business of a scientist. So when we
ask about the integrity of science qua institution, the primary concern
is likely to be how successfully the institution ensures that everyone in-
volved behaves as nearly as possible in accordance with those episte-
mological values.
Haack, supra note 23, at 11.
74 See generally DAVID SLOAN WILSON, DARWIN’S CATHEDRAL (2002).
75 See generally RICHARD DAWKINS, THE BLIND WATCHMAKER (1986).
76 FRANCIS S. COLLINS, THE LANGUAGE OF GOD 67 (2006).
77 Linda Greenhouse, Opinion, Law in the Raw, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 12, 2014), http://www.ny
times.com/2014/11/13/opinion/law-in-the-raw.html?_r=0; see also Stephen M. Feldman,
Supreme Court Alchemy: Turning Law and Politics into Mayonnaise, 12 GEO. J.L. & PUB.
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having survived an increasingly polarized nominating process.78 Although Ms.
Greenhouse’s concern is too important to omit from any serious discussion of the cur-
rent Court, it is not easy to answer. This Article responds, in part, by focusing on the
Justices’s individual and collective policy-making responsibilities. Greater transpar-
ency, neutrality, and more accurate fact-finding informed by new insights into com-
munication, behavior, and cognition are the most effective antidotes to the poison
of a political judiciary.79
I. SCIENCE, SCIENCE POLICY, AND LAW: THE PROBLEM OF EVIDENCE HEGEMONY
Two decades ago, in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., the Supreme
Court addressed scientific epistemology for the first time.80 Daubert embodied the
Court’s conclusion that a brave new world of science-based legal decisions would
need “gatekeeping” judges who could operate the tools of science to evaluate scien-
tific evidence.81 The “revolution” of Daubert was that judges should evaluate sci-
entific “principles and methodology, not on the conclusions that they generate.”82 The
manifesto of the Daubert science and law revolution was fleshed out over the next few
POL’Y 57, 61 (2014) (explaining that the current Justices are “simultaneously correct and in-
correct when they insist that they decide cases by focusing on the law and not contemplating
politics” because “politics is always part of legal interpretation and, therefore, judicial decision-
making” and “politics is so deeply embedded in the judicial process that, in most cases, the
justices do not consciously consider their political preferences”).
78 Geoffrey R. Stone, Our Politically Polarized Supreme Court?, HUFFINGTON POST,
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/geoffrey-r-stone/our-politically-polarized_b_5879346.html
[http://perma.cc/TAF4-UQK4] (last updated Nov. 25, 2014, 5:59 AM).
79 Of course, these concerns are not limited to the judiciary. As Professor Marci Hamilton
recently and astutely opined:
Transparency in lawmaking increases the accountability of representa-
tives to the public, encourages frank debate about specifics, reveals hidden
lobbyist agendas, and reduces unintended consequences. Neither repre-
sentatives primarily motivated by a desire to stay in power nor special
interests embrace transparency, making it an elusive goal but still a mea-
sure of a good public policy process.
Marci A. Hamilton, The Case for Evidence-Based Free Exercise Accommodation: Why the
Religious Freedom Restoration Act Is Bad Public Policy, 9 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 129 (2015).
80 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
81 Id. at 589 (explaining that the trial judge must now ensure that scientific testimony is
scientifically reliable); see also Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 147 (1999)
(extending the Daubert requirement that judges assess the reliability of scientific evidence to
evidence involving technical expertise and specialized knowledge).
82 Daubert, 509 U.S. at 595. However, four years after Daubert, the Court acknowledged
that the task of distinguishing principles, methods, and conclusions might not be simple. See
Gen. Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 146 (1997) (concluding that, in science, “conclusions
and methodology are not entirely distinct from one another”).
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years in the now famous trilogy of cases that includes General Electric Co. v. Joiner83
and Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael.84
A. The Daubert Trilogy
Justice Blackmun, who wrote for the Daubert majority, offered future judges
four flexible factors they could use to assess science on its own terms: (1) testability;
(2) peer review and publication; (3) error rates; and (4) general acceptance within the
relevant scientific community.85 The Daubert Court sought to eliminate a century
of deference to the scientific community under Frye v. United States86 and to avoid
a future of epistemic relativism on empirical questions of scientific evidence. Justice
Blackmun also reminded judges that they must ensure that the proffered expert evi-
dence “fit” the facts at issue.87 Justice Rehnquist was the first to express reservations:
“I defer to no one in my confidence in federal judges; but I am at a loss to know what
is meant when it is said that the scientific status of a theory depends on its ‘falsi-
fiability,’ and I suspect some of them will be, too.”88 Judge Alex Kozinski of the
Ninth Circuit, to whose court Daubert was remanded, shared Justice Rehnquist’s
83 522 U.S. 136. In Joiner, the plaintiff claimed that exposure to polychlorinated biphenyls
(PCBs) caused his lung cancer. See id. at 139–40. In support, the plaintiff offered four epide-
miological studies establishing a link between PCBs and cancer. See id. at 145. After review-
ing plaintiff’s evidence, the district court concluded that: (1) the first study did not actually
find that PCBs had caused lung cancer among the workers they had examined; (2) the second
study found only a statistically insignificant increase in cancer rates among workers at a PCB
plant; (3) the third study did not involve PCBs; and (4) the fourth study’s subjects had been
exposed to numerous potential carcinogens. See id. at 145–46. Moreover, according to the Su-
preme Court, the Eleventh Circuit had improperly used a “stringent standard of review” when
reversing the district court’s decision to exclude the plaintiff’s scientific evidence. Id. at 140–43.
84 526 U.S. 137.
85 Daubert, 509 U.S. at 593–94. Although “reliability” is the term used most frequently by
the courts, this term of art refers specifically to the ability of a second scientist to reproduce the
results of an earlier experiment. The difference between “reliability” and “validity” can be de-
fined as follows: “As a term of art in science and statistics, reliability refers to the reproduc-
ibility of data. A reliable test can be repeated under identical circumstances and yield the same
results. The results may be consistently wrong, but that is an issue of validity, not reliability.”
KENNETH R. FOSTER & PETER W. HUBER, JUDGING SCIENCE: SCIENTIFIC KNOWLEDGE AND
THE FEDERAL COURTS 11 (1997) (second emphasis added).
86 293 F. 1013, 1014 (D.C. Cir. 1923) (holding that scientific evidence should be admitted
when it is “sufficiently established to have gained general acceptance in the particular field in
which it belongs”).
87 The “fit” requirement was defined by the Daubert Court as follows: the “scientific knowl-
edge . . . will assist the trier of fact to understand or determine a fact in issue.” Daubert, 509
U.S. at 592. This is essentially identical to the Federal Rule of Evidence 702 requirement that
an expert testifying to “scientific . . . knowledge will help the trier of fact to understand the evi-
dence or to determine a fact in issue.” FED. R. EVID. 702.
88 Daubert, 509 U.S. at 600 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
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dim view of Daubert, bemoaning judges’ ability “to resolve disputes among respected,
well-credentialed scientists about matters squarely within their expertise, in areas
where there is no scientific consensus as to what is and what is not ‘good science,’
and occasionally to reject such expert testimony because it was not ‘derived by the
scientific method.’”89
Four years later in General Electric Co. v. Joiner, the Court clarified that abuse
of discretion was the appropriate review standard for all evidence decisions, includ-
ing the exclusion of scientific testimony,90 and added that “nothing in either Daubert
or the Federal Rules of Evidence requires a district court to admit opinion evidence
that is connected to existing data only by the ipse dixit of the expert.”91 Finally, in
1999, Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael refined Daubert in three ways: (1) judges
would now be required to “gatekeep” testimony from experts with technical and other
specialized knowledge;92 (2) judges should seek to admit testimony from experts who
employ “the same level of intellectual rigor” in the courtroom as in their fields of
study;93 and (3) judges must ensure “fit” between the expert opinion and the specific
facts at issue.94
B. Science and Law Is Not an Evidence Problem
Two decades after Daubert, traditional conceptualizations of science and law
as a problem of junk science and evidence rules continue to dominate the legal liter-
ature. But law professors who echo the complaint that courts just cannot handle the
science fail to understand that Daubert and the ensuing two decades of evidence
89 Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 43 F.3d 1311, 1316 (9th Cir. 1995).
90 522 U.S. 136, 143 (1997).
91 Id. at 146.
92 526 U.S. 137, 148 (1999); see also Edward J. Imwinkelried, The Taxonomy of Testimony
Post-Kumho: Refocusing on the Bottomlines of Reliability and Necessity, 30 CUMB. L. REV. 185,
209 (2000) (noting that prior to Kumho, “[t]he objective validity of a non-scientific expert’s
premises was essentially exempt from any scrutiny”). According to Professor Imwinkelried,
“Kumho not only establishes that Daubert is still good law; it also expands the scope of the
Daubert doctrine . . . [,] [extending] Daubert’s reliability/validation standard . . . to all types
of expert testimony . . . .” Id. at 211.
93 Kumho, 526 U.S. at 152.
94 Id. at 153–54. Justice Breyer, writing for the Kumho majority, modeled the appropriate
emphasis on “fit” when he admonished that “the specific issue before the [district] court was not
the reasonableness in general of a tire expert’s use of a visual and tactile inspection . . . [but]
the reasonableness of using such an approach . . . to draw a conclusion regarding the particular
matter to which the expert testimony was directly relevant.” Id. I have emphasized elsewhere
my view that Kumho reflected the Supreme Court’s effort to clarify Daubert by emphasizing
“fit” in an effort to simplify the new gatekeeping role and correct the earlier decision’s inher-
ent structural problems. See generally Joëlle Anne Moreno, Beyond the Polemic Against
Junk Science: Navigating the Oceans That Divide Science and Law with Justice Breyer at
the Helm, 81 B.U. L. REV. 1033, 1049–57 (2001).
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hegemony were never up to the challenge. There are (at least) three critical, but
overlooked, problems with the pervasive academic approach to science and law.
First, the Daubert trilogy viewed science and law as a question of trial evidence
and crafted a solution designed to enhance the trial process. In fact, the Daubert Court
explicitly assumed that “[v]igorous cross-examination, presentation of contrary evi-
dence, and careful instruction on the burden of proof”95 would help judges identify
specious science. As of February 2015, a snapshot of current non-evidence science and
law controversies includes new “scientific” critiques of evolution poised to restructure
public school biology curricula,96 current restrictions in twenty-eight states limiting
public school sex education to the “scientific” theory of abstinence,97 and pending abor-
tion restrictions in seventeen states purportedly based on a range of “scientific” theo-
ries of maternal risk and “scientific” critique of current medical procedures.98 Thus,
Daubert may provide generally useful insights about scientific integrity or the sci-
entific method, but the Court did not create decision-making tools that could operate
outside the adversarial process.
Second, a Daubert-focused approach to judges as “gatekeepers” minimizes the
policy-making significance of the judicial role. Gatekeepers have one responsibility—
to monitor what comes in the gate, but what goes out of the courthouse gate is equally,
if not more, important. Law does not happen in a vacuum. Thus, as Justice Breyer has
observed: “The importance of scientific accuracy in the decision of cases reaches well
beyond the case itself.”99 When judges opine on the state of the natural world, they must
“search for law that reflects an understanding of the relevant underlying science.”100
Third, a narrow focus on evidence rules and standards cannot accommodate the
depth of our scientific ignorance101 or our collective misperception of risk across the full
95 Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 596 (1993).
96 Senators File Bill for Teaching Theories on Controversial Scientific Subjects, CRUX
(Jan. 21, 2015), http://www.cruxnow.com/church/2015/01/21/senators-file-bill-critic-says
-permits-teaching-creationism/ [http://perma.cc/HQ8T-WNCG].
97 Kevin Freking, States Reject Abstinence-Only Funding from Federal Government,
HUFFINGTON POST, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2008/06/24/states-reject-abstinence_n
_109002.html [http://perma.cc/6ZFW-G47S] (last updated May 25, 2011, 12:35 PM).
98 For an updated list of states introducing abortion-regulating legislation, see Monthly
State Update: Major Developments in 2015, GUTTMACHER INST., http://www.guttmacher.org
/statecenter/updates/ [http://perma.cc/3JNS-5S9D] (last updated Nov. 1, 2015); Paige Winfield
Cunningham, The Coming Wave of Anti-Abortion Laws, POLITICO (Nov. 28, 2014, 8:07 AM),
http://www.politico.com/story/2014/11/the-coming-wave-of-anti-abortion-laws-113196.html
[http://perma.cc/VN38-6VKF].
99 Stephen Breyer, Introduction to FED. JUDICIAL CTR., REFERENCE MANUAL ON SCI-
ENTIFIC EVIDENCE 1, 4 (3d ed. 2011).
100 Id.
101 Christine Armario, “Wake-Up Call”: U.S. Students Trail Global Leaders, NBCNEWS
.COM, http://www.nbcnews.com/id/40544897/ns/us_news-life/t/wake-up-call-us-students-trail
-global-leaders/#.VNkXz1PF9XZ [http://perma.cc/2SNG-5NN6] (last updated Dec. 7, 2010,
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range of transdisciplinary science and law questions. We are generally unsophisticated
and poorly informed about basic science: 43% of Americans believe that humans once
lived among dinosaurs,102 and 20% believe that the sun revolves around the earth.103
We are equally bad at judging risk, an essential component of accurate decision-
making. Perceptions of risk, which are “the intuitive judgments that people make
about the hazards of their world . . . can be stubbornly resistant to the evidence of
experts.”104 People “do not tend to be afraid of the things that are most likely to harm
us. We drive around in cars, a lot; we drink alcohol; we ride bicycles; we sit too much.
And we harbor anxiety about things that, statistically speaking, pose little danger.”105
For example, “[w]e fear sharks, while mosquitoes are, in terms of sheer numbers of
lives lost, probably the most dangerous creature on earth.”106 Given these shortcom-
ings, a better understanding of evidence rules will do little to address the full spec-
trum of current and future science and law questions.
II. THE SCIENCE OF NATURE AND THE NATURE OF SCIENCE
A. Legitimate, False, and Manufactured Science Controversies
Some scientific controversies are real; some are false. Challenges to the existence
of global warming and the fear that childhood vaccines cause autism are false con-
troversies because there is near consensus in the global scientific community on these
questions.107 Near consensus in science means, as with all legitimate scientific re-
search, that there may be unresolved questions that merit future investigation and
7:17 PM) (noting that American high school students rank seventeenth out of thirty-four
countries in science).
102 George F. Bishop et al., Americans’ Scientific Knowledge and Beliefs About Human
Evolution in the Year of Darwin, 30 REP. NAT’L CTR. FOR SCI. EDUC. 16 (2010), http://ncse
.com/rncse/30/3/americans-scientific-knowledge-beliefs-human-evolution-year- [http://perma.cc
/7AZW-AKSA]; see also Miller et al., supra note 71, at 25. Miller’s report makes for grim
reading for adherents of evolutionary theory. Although the average American has more years of
education than when Miller began his surveys twenty years ago, the percentage of people in the
country who accept the idea of evolution has declined from 45% in 1985 to 40% in 2005. Id.
103 See Nicholas D. Kristof, Opinion, The Hubris of the Humanities, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 6,
2005, at A27 (describing the results of a recent study of basic scientific knowledge).
104 EULA BISS, ON IMMUNITY 36 (2014) (quoting historian Michael Willrich).
105 Id.
106 Id.
107 See generally Leah Ceccarelli, Manufactured Scientific Controversy: Science, Rhetoric,
and Public Debate, 14 RHETORIC & PUB. AFF. 195 (2011) (discussing the false “manufactured”
controversies of global warming skepticism, dissent over AIDS being caused by HIV, and
intelligent design); Vaccines Do Not Cause Autism, CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL &
PREVENTION, http://www.cdc.gov/vaccinesafety/concerns/autism/Index.html [http://perma.cc
/BJE4-2LZH] (last updated Nov. 23, 2015) (discussing the false “scientific controversy”
regarding whether childhood vaccines can cause autism).
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reasonable experts may differ over select issues, but these unresolved matters do not
threaten core settled scientific foundations. As Professor Susan Haack has observed:
At any time there is a whole continuum of scientific ideas, claims,
and theories: some so well-warranted by such strong evidence
that it is most unlikely they will have to be revised; some not quite
so well-warranted but still pretty solidly established; some prom-
ising but as yet far from certain; some new and exciting but highly
speculative and as yet untested; and some so wild that few main-
stream scientists are willing even to listen to them. (The proportion
of the well-warranted to the highly-speculative varies, obviously,
across fields and sub-fields.) A few of the exciting but as yet un-
tested ideas, and a very, very few of the wildest ideas, will even-
tually turn out to be warrantable, but most will not.108
In contrast, false scientific controversies have been fabricated to encourage courts,
legislators, and the public to ignore or reject scientifically sound information in favor
of purported “truthiness” claims that cannot be empirically supported.109 Proponents
of false or manufactured controversies typically “exploit[ ] a popular conception that
science advances only when heroic dissidents push at the frontiers of normal science
to initiate a paradigm change”110 and “orient themselves as critics of the world-defining
hegemony of scientific discourse”111 in the hope of “bringing the scientific establish-
ment down a notch or two.”112
False and manufactured controversies are a form of denialism. Denialism, accord-
ing to Michael Specter, “comes in many forms,” but typically “draw[s] direct rela-
tionships where none exist” and “conflate[s] similar but distinct issues.”113 Unless the
“data fits neatly into an already formed theory, a denialist doesn’t really see it as data
at all. That enables him to dismiss even the most compelling evidence as just an-
other point of view.”114 In her excellent new work on “manufactured” controversies
108 Susan Haack, Of Truth, in Science and in Law, 73 BROOK. L. REV. 985, 996 (2008).
109 Martin McKee & Pascal Diethelm, How the Growth of Denialism Undermines Public
Health, 341 BRIT. MED. J. 1309, 1311 (2010) (noting that false scientific controversies are a
form of “denialism” in the medical arena and are characterized by several features including:
(a) “[i]dentification of conspiracies”; (b) “[u]se of fake experts”; (c) “[s]electivity of citation”;
(d) “[c]reation of impossible expectations of research”; (e) “[m]isrepresentation and logical
fallacies”; and (f) “[m]anufacture of doubt”).
110 Ceccarelli, supra note 107, at 209.
111 Id. at 199.
112 Id.
113 MICHAEL SPECTER, DENIALISM: HOW IRRATIONAL THINKING HINDERS SCIENTIFIC
PROGRESS, HARMS THE PLANET, AND THREATENS OUR LIVES 3 (2009).
114 Id.
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and settled science, Professor Leah Ceccarelli explains that “[a] scientific controversy
is ‘manufactured’ . . . when an arguer announces there is an ongoing scientific de-
bate in the technical sphere about a matter for which there is actually overwhelming
scientific consensus.”115 To help avoid the problems of epistemic relativism between
a manufactured controversy and sound science, Professor Ceccarelli identifies com-
mon features to help non-scientists identify manufactured controversies, including:
(1) the use of mercenary scientists; (2) the use of cherry-picked data and manipulation
of statistical methods; (3) the manufacture and promotion of doubt and uncertainty;
and (4) the use of rhetoric to manufacture controversy in addition to uncertainty.116
B. The Settled Science of Evolution and Natural Selection
Charles Darwin published On the Origin of Species in 1859.117 The theory of
evolution developed as “the first serious challenge to traditional beliefs in divine
creation” and “Darwinism ‘shattered’ the notion that species had unchanging char-
acteristics, ‘and with it the view that humans are a distinct species, a special creation
of God.’”118
Almost 150 years later, modern science continues to amass empirical support
for natural selection, which is the idea that certain organisms are better equipped to
survive than others.119 The scientific evidence to support natural selection now extends
far beyond the fossil record to include “advances in genetics and molecular biology
[which] have now shown how heredity actually works, as well as explained the nature
of chance mutation . . . [and] DNA [which] now provides perhaps the single best
piece of evidence supporting the theory of evolution.”120 The National Academy of
Sciences has identified “further evidence for evolutionary theory from such diverse
arenas as . . . comparative anatomy (which reveals structural similarities in related
organisms . . .), species distribution (showing, for instance, that island species are
often distinct but closely related to mainland relatives), and embryology,”121 and
refers to evolution as “the central unifying concept of biology.”122
115 Ceccarelli, supra note 107, at 196.
116 Id. at 197.
117 CHARLES DARWIN, THE ORIGIN OF SPECIES (Oxford Univ. Press 1996) (1859).
118 Todd R. Olin, Note, Fruit of the Poison Tree: A First Amendment Analysis of the History
and Character of Intelligent Design Education, 90 MINN. L. REV. 1107, 1112–13 (2006)
(quoting Derek H. Davis, Kansas Versus Darwin: Examining the History and Future of the
Creationism-Evolution Controversy in American Public Schools, 9 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y
205, 210 (1999)).
119 Natural Selection, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary
/natural%20selection [http://perma.cc/Y72R-XNU5].
120 Mooney & Nisbet, supra note 5.
121 Id.
122 Id. (quoting the National Academy of Sciences).
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Recent developments provide additional scientific support from other fields. In
January 2014, Jeremy England, a young MIT professor, used well-accepted principles
of physics to demonstrate that “the origin and subsequent evolution of life follow
from the fundamental laws of nature and ‘should be as unsurprising as rocks rolling
downhill.’”123 According to Professor England,
[w]hen a group of atoms is driven by an external source of energy
(like the sun or chemical fuel) and surrounded by a heat bath (like
the ocean or atmosphere), it will often gradually restructure itself
in order to dissipate increasingly more energy . . . [,] [which
could prove] that under certain conditions, matter inexorably ac-
quires the key physical attribute associated with life.124
If physics provides an overarching principle of life and evolution, it may help
answer questions (and anti-evolution critique) on the development of species char-
acteristics, which would “liberate biologists from seeking a Darwinian explanation
for every adaptation.”125
Given the overwhelming empirical data, it is not surprising that Dr. Stephen J.
Gould once described evolution as “one of the half dozen ‘great ideas’ developed by
science.”126 Yet by the mid-1990s, Dr. Gould had become increasingly concerned that
the anti-evolution movement was gaining traction with ideas “that seemed kooky just
a decade ago . . . [but were] reenter[ing] the mainstream.”127 Challenges to the settled
scientific foundations of evolution128 did not arise within the relevant scientific com-
munity; they began in the courts.
C. The “Monkey” Trial: Tennessee v. Scopes
The modern history of the anti-evolution movement can be traced back ninety
years to the Scopes “monkey trial,”129 subsequently made famous by the play and
movie, Inherit the Wind.130 Scopes was the celebrity trial of the late 1920s. William
123 Natalie Wolchover, A New Physics Theory of Life, QUANTA MAG. (Jan. 22, 2014)




126 See STEPHEN JAY GOULD, HEN’S TEETH AND HORSE’S TOES 261 (1994).
127 Id. at 253.
128 See generally Looking for Information on Controversies in the Public Arena Relating
to Evolution?, UNDERSTANDING EVOLUTION, http://evolution.berkeley.edu/evolibrary/contro
versy_faq.php [http://perma.cc/Z6RV-ZCAU] (discussing the false “scientific controversy”
of intelligent design versus evolution).
129 Scopes v. State, 289 S.W. 363 (Tenn. 1927).
130 Playwrights Jerome Lawrence and Robert E. Lee wrote Inherit the Wind in 1950.
Douglas O. Linder, Notes on Inherit the Wind, SCOPES TRIAL (2008), http://law2.umkc.edu
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Jennings Bryan131 prosecuted John Scopes (a twenty-four-year-old public high school
science teacher).132 Clarence Darrow represented the defendant.133 H.L. Mencken
covered the trial in the press, which also had radio coverage.134 The country was
riveted. In fact, recent commentators have suggested that media coverage of the evo-
lution “debate” in Scopes established the “symbols and themes” that continue to dom-
inate the scientific, legal, and public policy questions today.135
John Scopes was a public school teacher who, with support from the American
Civil Liberties Union, taught the theory of evolution to his class.136 This was a direct
violation of a 1925 Tennessee statute that barred state public schools and universities
from teaching any theory that contradicted the biblical story of the creation.137 Dudley
Field Malone, a New York attorney who joined the defense team, famously argued
to the jury that evolution and natural selection were the truth because they were based
on sound and settled science.138 According to Malone,
[t]here is never a duel with the truth. The truth always wins and
we are not afraid of it. The truth is no coward. The truth does not
need the law. The truth does not need the force of government. The
truth does not need Mr. Bryan. The truth is imperishable, eternal
and immortal and needs no human agency to support it. We are
ready to tell the truth as we understand it and we do not fear all
/faculty/projects/ftrials/scopes/SCO_INHE.HTM [http://perma.cc/N69X-T7HQ]. A very useful
website devoted to famous trials in history created by Douglas O. Linder of the University of
Missouri–Kansas City School of Law contains extensive information about numerous trials.
See, e.g., Douglas O. Linder, State v. John Scopes (“The Monkey Trial”), SCOPES TRIAL
(2008), http://www.law2.umkc.edu/faculty/projects/FTrials/scopes/evolut.htm [http://perma
.cc/43BW-L3VD].
131 See generally SUSAN JACOBY, THE AGE OF AMERICAN UNREASON 78 (2008) (noting
that Bryan was a champion of early anti-evolutionists’ “war against godless science” and
suggesting that Bryan’s repeated reference during the Scopes trial to a 1914 science textbook
discussing eugenics (rather than natural selection) indicated that he may not have been espe-
cially familiar with Darwin’s work).
132 See Linder, supra note 130.
133 Id.
134 Id.
135 Jay D. Wexler, The Scopes Trope, 93 GEO. L.J. 1693, 1697 (2005) (book review)
(quoting LARRY A. WITHAM, WHERE DARWIN MEETS THE BIBLE: CREATIONISTS AND
EVOLUTIONISTS IN AMERICA 227 (2002)).
136 See Jana R. McCreary, This Is the Trap the Courts Built: Dealing with the Entan-
glement of Religion and the Origin of Life in American Public Schools, 37 SW. U. L. REV.
1, 35 (2008).
137 Scopes v. State, 289 S.W. 363, 363 (Tenn. 1927).
138 Malone Argues for Admission of Expert Testimony (5th Day), SCOPES TRIAL (2008),
http://www.law2.umkc.edu/faculty/projects/ftrials/scopes/day5.htm [http://perma.cc/ZZR3
-J3E3].
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the truth that they can present as facts. We are ready. We are ready.
We feel we stand with progress. We feel we stand with science.139
Hoping to encourage the Tennessee Supreme Court to advance the “truth” of evo-
lution on appeal, Darrow and Malone asked jurors to convict their client.140 Although
the jury obliged, the defense plan was thwarted when the Tennessee Supreme Court
reversed Scopes’s conviction, not on constitutional grounds, but because the judge,
rather than the jury, had set the amount of Scopes’s $100 fine.141 After Scopes,142 the
debate between creationism and evolution continued to rage outside the courts for
the next forty years.
D. The Supreme Court Weighs In: Epperson v. Arkansas
After forty years of debate, 1968 was a busy year in natural science. Among other
discoveries and developments, the first heart and bone marrow transplants were
performed,143 and maternal and fetal healthcare saw the establishment of amniocente-
sis (the chemical assessment of amniotic fluid) as a new and effective diagnosis tool
for prenatal assessment.144 That same year, in Epperson v. Arkansas,145 the Supreme
Court heard its first evolution case. Epperson invalidated an Arkansas statute pro-
hibiting “a teacher in any state-supported school or university ‘to teach the theory
or doctrine that mankind ascended or descended from a lower order of animals,’ or ‘to
adopt or use in any such institution a textbook that teaches’ this theory.”146 In a clear
and concise opinion for a unanimous Court, Justice Fortas found that the law was in
“conflict with the constitutional prohibition of state laws respecting an establishment
of religion or prohibiting the free exercise thereof,”147 because “Arkansas’ law selects
from the body of knowledge a particular segment which it proscribes for the sole rea-
son that it is deemed to conflict with a particular religious doctrine; that is, with a par-
ticular interpretation of the Book of Genesis by a particular religious group.”148
139 Id. (quoting Dudley Field Malone as defense counsel).
140 Linder, supra note 130.
141 See id.
142 Id.
143 See Heart Transplant Program, CLEV. CLINIC, http://my.clevelandclinic.org/services
/transplant-center/transplant-programs/heart-transplant-program [http://perma.cc/WA6Z-2QK5];
Theodore Moore, Bone Marrow Transplantation, MEDSCAPE, http://emedicine.medscape
.com/article/1014514-overview [http://perma.cc/3T66-AA4Y] (last updated Nov. 7, 2014).
144 See T. Lind, Diagnostic Uses of Amniocentesis in Late Pregnancy, 64 PROC. ROYAL
SOC’Y MED. 1140, 1140–41 (1971), http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC1812058
/?page=1 [http://perma.cc/4BMD-GEKA].
145 393 U.S. 97 (1968).
146 Id. at 98–99 (quoting Initiated Act No. 1, 1929 Arks. Acts; ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 80-1627,
80-1628 (1960 Repl. Vol.)).
147 Id. at 103.
148 Id.
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The Tennessee statute at issue four decades earlier in Scopes had explicitly limited
public school science curriculum to the biblical story of creation.149 Although the
Arkansas law contained no overt references to religious doctrine, the Epperson Court
easily inferred a legislative motive “to suppress the teaching of a theory which, it was
thought, ‘denied’ the divine creation of man.”150 Justice Fortas avoided the epistemo-
logical questions and instead based the decision on: (1) inquiry into the law’s purpose
and effects;151 (2) expert opinion that the law’s goals were ideological;152 and (3) the
statute’s explicit “Bible or Atheism?” campaign advertisements.153 This evidence
easily convinced a unanimous Court that Arkansas had violated the Establishment
Clause by seeking to “require that teaching and learning must be tailored to the prin-
ciples or prohibitions of a religious sect or dogma.”154 Anti-evolutionists were on no-
tice that direct prohibitions on teaching evolution would fail and they began looking
for alternative approaches.
1. Epistemic Relativism and Secular Humanism
After Epperson, orthodox Creationists continued to advance patently theistic
arguments (i.e., that school children should be instructed that Noah’s flood had created
the Grand Canyon).155 But prescient anti-evolutionists were starting to reconsider.
If the choice between evolution and Creation Science could be reformulated as a
decision between competing origin “beliefs,” new laws might succeed.
Starting in the 1970s, anti-evolutionists seeking epistemic equipoise initially
sought to recast evolution teachers (and their supporters) as adherents of the compet-
ing faith of “secular humanism.”156 This rhetorical retrofit might distract the Supreme
Court from the mounting empirical evidence, but nascent efforts to recharacterize
the ongoing public debate as a “battle of faiths” were quickly stymied in the federal
courts and ultimately abandoned.157
2. Epistemic Relativism and Academic Freedom
A decade later, Louisiana would try a different approach. The State’s new
“Balanced Treatment for Creation-Science and Evolution-Science in Public School
149 Scopes v. State, 289 S.W. 363, 363 (Tenn. 1927).
150 Epperson, 393 U.S. at 109.
151 Id.
152 Id. at 107–08 n.15.
153 Id. at 108 n.16.
154 Id. at 106.
155 See CHRIS MOONEY & SHERIL KIRSHENBAUM, UNSCIENTIFIC AMERICA: HOW SCIENTIFIC
ILLITERACY THREATENS OUR FUTURE 98–99 (2010).
156 See, e.g., Wright v. Hous. Indep. Sch. Dist., 366 F. Supp. 1208 (S.D. Tex. 1972), aff’d
per curiam, 486 F.2d 137 (5th Cir. 1973) (rejecting the anti-evolutionist argument that teaching
evolution advances the faith of secular humanism).
157 See, e.g., id.
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Instruction Act” required every public school or university that taught evolution to
provide equal time for Creation Science.158 According to the state legislature, this
law served a wholly secular educational purpose.159 Appropriating the language of
academic freedom, the drafters claimed that their goal was to create parity in the pre-
sentation of different scientific information in the public schools.160 This required
mandating that public schools provide “whatever information and instruction in both
creation and evolution models the classroom teacher determines is necessary and
appropriate to provide insight into both theories.”161
E. Redefining “Scientific Theory” and “Scientific Critique”: Edwards v. Aguillard
1. Skepticism from the Lower Courts
Unsurprisingly, after Epperson, the Louisiana Balanced Treatment Act was chal-
lenged on both state and federal constitutional grounds.162 After the state issues were
resolved, the Fifth Circuit remanded the case to the district court for resolution of
the Establishment Clause questions.163 The district court, well aware that the case
raised contentious policy issues, noted that the defendants had already filed “well over
one thousand pages of memoranda and summaries thereof and affidavits”164 on what
the court referred to as “collateral issues.”165 Confronted by a potential political mael-
strom, the district court decided not “to put the people of Louisiana to the very consid-
erable [and] needless expense (including fees of attorneys on both sides) of a protracted
trial.”166 Instead, the court granted the plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment find-
ing that, as a matter of law, the statute “violates the establishment clause . . . [b]ecause
it promotes the beliefs of some theistic sects to the detriment of others . . . [which]
violates the fundamental First Amendment principle that a state must be neutral in
its treatment of religions.”167
158 See Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 580–81 (1987) (citing LA. STAT. ANN.
§§ 17:286.1–17:286.7 (West 1982)).
159 Id. at 581.
160 Aguillard v. Treen, 634 F. Supp. 426, 429–30 (E.D. La. 1985).
161 Id. at 429 (quoting LA. STAT. ANN. § 17:286.3 (West 1981)).
162 The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana initially held that
the statute violated the state constitution. On appeal, the Fifth Circuit certified the state con-
stitutional question to the Louisiana Supreme Court. Id. at 426 (citing Aguillard v. Treen, 720
F.2d 676 (5th Cir. 1983)). After the state supreme court found no violation of the Louisiana
Constitution, id., the case was reversed and remanded by the Fifth Circuit so that the district
court could consider the Establishment Clause challenge. Id.
163 Id.
164 Id. at 427.
165 Id.
166 Id.
167 Id. at 429.
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The district court decision was affirmed by the Fifth Circuit, which agreed that
the Establishment Clause was violated because, despite the lack of overt religious
objectives, the statute lacked a genuine secular purpose.168 According to the federal
appellate court, the Louisiana legislature had clearly intended to “discredit evolution
by counterbalancing its teaching at every turn with the teaching of creationism.”169
Louisiana appealed to the Supreme Court. When Edwards v. Aguillard reached
the Court, the threshold issue was whether the Louisiana legislature had genuinely sec-
ular objectives.170 Two purposes advanced by the state would be considered: (1) pro-
moting academic freedom in the public schools; and (2) expanding the state’s science
curriculum.171 Either of these overlapping objectives could satisfy the Establishment
Clause under the “secular purpose” prong of the three-pronged Lemon test.172 But
under Lemon, even if the act’s purpose was secular, the Court would also need to
find that the law: (1) did not advance or inhibit religion; and (2) would not result in an
excessive entanglement of government with religion.173
2. Academic Freedom
Justice Brennan wrote for a seven-Justice majority. The Court began by noting
that “the Act’s stated purpose is to protect academic freedom.”174 The Edwards Court
was skeptical. According to Justice Brennan, “the Court is normally deferential to a
State’s articulation of a secular purpose, [but] it is required that the statement of such
purpose be sincere and not a sham.”175
In the Court’s view, the Louisiana Balanced Treatment Act did not protect aca-
demic freedom. According to the majority, it did “not grant teachers a flexibility that
they did not already possess to supplant the present science curriculum with the pre-
sentation of theories, besides evolution, about the origin of life.”176 As Justice Brennan
168 Aguillard v. Edwards, 765 F.2d 1251 (5th Cir. 1985).
169 Id. at 1257.
170 482 U.S. 578 (1987).
171 Id. at 586.
172 Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612–13 (1971).
173 Id.
174 Edwards, 482 U.S. at 586 (quoting LA. STAT. ANN. § 17:286.2 (West 1982)). Justice
Brennan analyzed the defendants’ academic freedom argument by exploring two possible def-
initions of academic freedom. The first, which the Court drew from “common parlance,” in-
volved “enhancing the freedom of teachers to teach what they will.” Id. The second, which had
been specifically advanced by the defendants during oral argument, was a more circumscribed
“basic concept of fairness.” Id. This second form of academic freedom, the defendants had
argued, included the right to teach public school students “‘all of the evidence’ with respect
to the origin of human beings.” Id. Justice Brennan concluded that, under either definition, the
law could not advance academic freedom. See id.
175 Id. at 586–87.
176 Id. at 587. According to the Edwards Court, Louisiana public school teachers did not
need the Balanced Treatment Act because “[a]ny scientific concept that’s based on established
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noted, “Even if ‘academic freedom’ is read to mean ‘teaching all of the evidence’
with respect to the origin of human beings, the Act does not further this purpose.”177
Accordingly, the stated secular goal of “academic freedom” was deemed a sham.
3. Advancing Scientific Knowledge
Having disposed of the academic freedom argument, Justice Brennan addressed
the state’s second secular “goal of providing a more comprehensive science cur-
riculum . . . either by outlawing the teaching of evolution or by requiring the teach-
ing of creation science.”178 Put simply, was Louisiana seeking to include competing
scientific perspectives to provide public school students with a more “comprehensive
scientific education”?179 If so, the statute was constitutional. If instead, evolution and
natural selection were settled areas of science well substantiated by the empirical evi-
dence, Creation Science arguments were religious critique that would not “maximize
the comprehensiveness and effectiveness of science instruction.”180 In the Court’s
view, because the state offered no evidence that the law advanced science education,
its purpose must have been “to advance the religious viewpoint that a supernatural
being created humankind.”181
Unfortunately, Justice Brennan included two caveats that may have appeared
inconsequential at the time, but would spawn a new jurisprudence of epistemic rela-
tivism on questions of settled science. First, he limited Edwards to its facts, ensuring
that the decision would only control state efforts “to restructure the science curriculum
to conform with a particular religious viewpoint.”182 Second, and more importantly,
Justice Brennan assured future state legislators that public schoolhouse doors would
remain open to any law mandating “teaching a variety of scientific theories about the
origins of humankind to schoolchildren”183 or the teaching of “scientific critiques of
fact can be included in [their] curriculum already, and no legislation allowing this is necessary.”
Id. (first alteration in original) (quoting the Louisiana Science Teachers Association). Thus,
“[t]he goal of providing a more comprehensive science curriculum is not furthered either by
outlawing the teaching of evolution or by requiring the teaching of creation science,” id. at 586,
and “requiring schools to teach creation science with evolution does not advance academic
freedom,” id. Ironically, the Court found that the law did not even enhance the academic free-
dom of so-called Creation Science itself because under this law, Creation Science would only
be taught when the curriculum already included evolution. Id. at 589.
177 Id. at 586.
178 Id.
179 Id. at 587.
180 Id. at 588.
181 Id. at 591. Louisiana was advancing religious doctrine “by requiring either the banishment
of the theory of evolution from public school classrooms or the presentation of a religious view-
point that rejects evolution in its entirety.” Id. at 596.
182 Id. at 593.
183 Id. at 594 (emphasis added). Adding to the confusion about the Edwards Court’s intent,
this description of a constitutionally permissible statute requiring that teachers explain
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prevailing scientific theories.”184 The Edwards Court’s failure to define “scientific
theory” and “scientific critique” was a critical omission that ignored the extensive evi-
dence provided to help the Court delineate science from pseudoscience.185
4. Ignoring the Scientific Evidence and the Scientists
The National Academy of Sciences (NAS), concerned about the potential impact
of Edwards, had filed an amicus brief urging the Court to confront the epistemolog-
ical questions by recognizing that natural science questions of evolution and natural
selection were sound and settled science.186 NAS further urged the Court to define
legitimate science as “grounded in observable facts.”187 To support this conclusion,
NAS argued that “[a] hallmark of a scientific proposition is that it is capable of dis-
proof, [and] is subject to being falsified by empirical observation.”188 Scientific cri-
tique was not simply any critique or alternative opinion. More specifically, the Court
should not endorse the Creationists’s false “two-model approach,” which “requires
competing theories of the origins of life, occurs in the midst of a digression into why the Ten
Commandments can be discussed in public schools even if they cannot be posted. See id. This
Edwards dicta has been used by Intelligent Design proponents to argue that the Supreme Court
did not “plac[e] its imprimatur on Darwinism,” but instead “defended the principle of open-
ness in science education.” Jay D. Wexler, Darwin, Design, and Disestablishment: Teaching
the Evolution Controversy in Public Schools, 56 VAND. L. REV. 751, 812 (2003) (quoting
DAVID K. DEWOLF ET AL., INTELLIGENT DESIGN IN PUBLIC SCHOOL SCIENCE CURRICULA:
A LEGAL GUIDEBOOK (1999) (suggesting that Intelligent Design will enhance science edu-
cation)). Wexler suggests that
there are at least three problems with relying upon this general theory
of science education as support for teaching students about intelligent
design as an alternative to evolution. First, it is far from clear that schools
are currently failing to teach students generally about the nature and
process of science. . . . 
Second, given that scientists overwhelmingly support the theory
of evolution and reject the theory of intelligent design, the controversy
over these theories would not be a very good example to use to teach
students about the gradual progression of scientific knowledge and
understanding. . . . 
Finally, . . . teaching this one scientific controversy in isolation
still would constitute an arbitrary choice that is radically underinclusive
with respect to achieving the desired goal.
Id. at 809–10 (footnote omitted).
184 Edwards, 482 U.S. at 593 (emphasis added).
185 See DAVID L. FAIGMAN, LEGAL ALCHEMY: THE USE AND MISUSE OF SCIENCE IN THE
LAW 25 (2000) (opining that “[i]n Edwards, the Court missed an invaluable opportunity to
make a statement about its and the Constitution’s commitment to science”).
186 Brief for the Nat’l Acad. of Scis. as Amicus Curiae Urging Affirmance, Edwards, 482
U.S. 578 (No. 85-1513), 1986 WL 727667.
187 Id. at *6.
188 Id.
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that data inconsistent with the current formulation of one model be treated as evidence
supporting the opposing model.”189 According to NAS, this approach to “scientific
theory” and “scientific critique” “bears no relation to scientific reasoning, and stifles
scientific inquiry, for it denies the possibility that empirical observation may suggest
new theories of even greater explanatory force.”190 Unfortunately, the Edwards Court’s
invitation to anti-evolution “scientific theories about the origins of humankind”191
and “scientific critiques of prevailing scientific theories”192 adopted the false dichot-
omy of the “two-model approach.”
A second amicus brief—filed by seventy-two Nobel Laureate scientists—sought
a similarly definitive statement about natural science from the Court.193 The Nobel
scientists devoted eleven lengthy paragraphs to a discussion of basic scientific princi-
ples that the Court could use to explicitly distinguish science from pseudoscience.194
The Justices should, in the view of the Nobel Laureates, clarify that science is inquiry
“devoted to formulating and testing naturalistic explanations for natural phenomena”195
that uses “a process for systematically collecting and recording data about the physi-
cal world, then categorizing and studying the collected data in an effort to infer the
principles of nature that best explain the observed phenomena.”196 Real scientific theo-
ries are proved, improved, or disproved using the “scientific method,” which “involves
the rigorous, methodological testing of principles that might present a naturalistic
explanation for . . . facts.”197 A “legitimate scientific ‘hypothesis,’” according to the
Nobel scientists, “must be consistent with prior and present observations and must
remain subject to continued testing against future observations.”198 These suggestions,
like the NAS recommendations, were ignored by the Edwards Court.
5. Ignoring Relevant Cases
The Justices were also well aware that the lower courts had recently addressed
similar science policy questions. Just five years earlier, in McLean v. Arkansas Board
of Education,199 Federal District Judge William R. Overton evaluated a nearly identical
189 Id. at *16.
190 Id.
191 Edwards, 482 U.S. at 588.
192 Id. at 593.
193 See Brief for 72 Nobel Laureates et al. as Amicus Curiae in Support of Appellees,
Edwards, 482 U.S. 578 (No. 85-1513), 1986 WL 727658.
194 See id. at *22–26.




199 529 F. Supp. 1255, 1264 (E.D. Ark. 1982) (holding that examination of the text of the
Arkansas statute, the stated sectarian legislative purpose, and the historical context of the
statute’s enactment revealed that it “was simply and purely an effort to introduce the Biblical
version of creation into the public school curricula”).
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“Balanced Treatment for Creation-Science and Evolution-Science Act” and found
that it violated the Establishment Clause.200
Judge Overton, unlike Justice Brennan, had refused to accept the possibility that
evolution opponents might be advancing legitimate scientific theory or critique. In-
stead, he engaged in a lengthy and intellectually rigorous critique of the state’s sci-
ence education claims. The epistemology of science mattered to Judge Overton, who
opined that a theory is not “scientific” based on the say-so of its proponents.201 Instead,
it must have the following “essential characteristics” of legitimate science: “(1) It is
guided by natural law; (2) It has to be explanatory by reference to natural law; (3) It
is testable against the empirical world; (4) Its conclusions are tentative, i.e., are not
necessarily the final words; and (5) It is falsifiable.”202 Only after a thorough review
of the predicate epistemological questions and an accurate and detailed delineation
between a theory and a “scientific” theory, did the McLean Court hold that Creation
Science “is simply not science.”203 But McLean, like the briefs filed by NAS and the
Nobel Laureates, had no apparent impact on the Edwards Court.204
6. Justice Scalia’s Dissent: Creation Science Is Science
Justice Scalia, who joined the Court the same term that Edwards was decided,
seized the opportunity to answer the epistemological questions avoided by the majority.
200 See generally id. Although McLean, like Edwards, ultimately relied on the Establishment
Clause test from Lemon v. Kurtzman, the federal district court specifically linked the Arkansas
Balanced Treatment Act to other unconstitutional religious fundamentalist efforts, such as laws
requiring the daily recitation of prayer in the public schools, id. at 1258 (citing Engel v.
Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962)), and those requiring that the Ten Commandments be posted in
public school classrooms, id. (citing Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39 (1980)). According to the
McLean Court,
[t]he religious movement known as Fundamentalism began in nineteenth
century America as part of evangelical Protestantism’s response to social
changes, new religious thought and Darwinism. Fundamentalists viewed
these developments as attacks on the Bible and as responsible for a de-
cline in traditional values. The various manifestations of Fundamental-
ism have had a number of common characteristics, but a central premise
has always been a literal interpretation of the Bible and a belief in the
inerrancy of the Scriptures. Following World War I, there was again a
perceived decline in traditional morality, and Fundamentalism focused
on evolution as responsible for the decline. One aspect of their efforts,
particularly in the South, was the promotion of statutes prohibiting the
teaching of evolution in public schools.
Id. at 1258–59 (footnote omitted).
201 Id. at 1267.
202 Id.
203 See generally id.
204 See FAIGMAN, supra note 185, at 25 (opining that “the [Edwards] Court seemed fearful
of substantively evaluating the scientific merit of creation science” because of “the Justices’
insecurity in their knowledge of science”).
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In a colorful dissenting opinion joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist, he argued his own
brand of science law jurisprudence.205 After critiquing the majority’s misapplication
of the Lemon test and faulting the Justices in the majority for relying on “visceral
knowledge” to discern legislative motive, Justice Scalia offered detailed approbation
of the testimony that had supported the Louisiana Balanced Treatment Act.206
In Justice Scalia’s view, the statute had been fully supported by “scientific lec-
tures [that] touched upon, inter alia, biology, paleontology, genetics, astronomy, astro-
physics, probability analysis, and biochemistry.”207 This was illustrated by testimony
including the following “scientific” evidence and critique:
• “There are two and only two explanations for the beginning of life—
evolution and creation science.”208
• “The body of scientific evidence supporting creation science is as strong
as that supporting evolution. In fact, it may be stronger.”209
• “Creation science is educationally valuable.”210
• “Although creation science is educationally valuable and strictly scientific,
it is now being censored from or misrepresented in the public schools.”211
• “The censorship of creation science . . . deprives students of knowledge
of one of the two scientific explanations for the origin of life . . . .”212
Justice Scalia opined that the majority’s hostility to Creation Science was attribut-
able to “an intellectual predisposition created by the facts and legend of Scopes v.
State—an instinctive reaction that any governmentally imposed requirements bearing
upon the teaching of evolution must be a manifestation of Christian fundamentalist
repression.”213 In the dissenters’ view, “we cannot say that on the evidence before
us . . . that the scientific evidence for evolution is so conclusive that no one could be
gullible enough to believe that there is any real scientific evidence to the contrary.”214
Accordingly, Louisiana residents “are quite entitled, as a secular matter, to have what-
ever scientific evidence there may be against evolution presented in their schools.”215
Finally, Justice Scalia noted that many of the statute’s proponents “enjoyed
academic credentials that may have been regarded as quite impressive by members
205 See generally Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 610 (1987) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
206 Id. at 621–26 (citation omitted).
207 Id. at 622 (first emphasis added).
208 Id. (footnote omitted).
209 Id. at 623.
210 Id.
211 Id.
212 Id. at 624.
213 Id. at 634 (citation omitted).
214 Id.
215 Id.
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of the Louisiana Legislature.”216 For an eventual master of rhetorical clarity on this last
point, Justice Scalia leaves readers to guess whether he intended to compliment the
statute’s advocates or insult its legislator opponents.
7. The Scientists Respond
Evolutionary biologist Stephen Jay Gould immediately recognized the risks posed
by the Edwards Court’s failure to acknowledge the sound and settled science and its
acceptance of the potential scientific legitimacy of evolution critics and opponents. In
a short essay published the following fall, Professor Gould argued that Justice Scalia,
in particular, had misunderstood the facts.217 In Gould’s view, “Justice Scalia does not
understand the subject matter of evolutionary biology . . . [and] has simply adopted
the creationists’ definition and thereby repeated their willful mistake.”218 In the dis-
senters’ key statement describing “scientific” theories and critique, Gould believed
they had mistakenly opined that “[t]he people of Louisiana, including those who are
Christian fundamentalists, are quite entitled, as a secular matter, to have whatever
scientific evidence there may be against evolution presented in their schools.”219 The
fundamental problem was that science education policy was not treated as a legal dis-
pute that “hinge[s] on a question of scientific fact.”220 Instead, the dissenters rejected
the data in favor of epistemic relativism when they “denie[d] that we have sufficient
evidence to render this judgment.”221
On the key questions of what is science and which theories and critiques are
genuinely scientific, Justice Scalia had argued that scientists could not say that the
scientific evidence for evolution was “conclusive.”222 But, according to Professor
Gould, “this is exactly what . . . all scientists, do say.”223 Evolution, in Professor
Gould’s opinion, is settled science because it “is as well confirmed as anything we
know—surely as well as the earth’s shape and position.”224 Justice Brennan’s invita-
tion to state lawmakers to base future science education policy on anti-evolutionist’s
self-described “scientific” theories and “scientific” critique ignored the empirical
evidence. It also erased the distinction between critique and scientific critique. In
216 Id. at 621.
217 Stephen J. Gould, Justice Scalia’s Misunderstanding, 5 CONST. COMMENT. 1 (1988),
https://conservancy.umn.edu/bitstream/handle/11299/170842/05_01_Gould.pdf?sequence
=1&isAllowed=y [http://perma.cc/G5VM-BT85].
218 Id. at 8.
219 Id. (quoting Edwards, 482 U.S. at 634 (Scalia, J., dissenting)).
220 Id. at 9.
221 Id.
222 Edwards, 482 U.S. at 634 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
223 See Gould, supra note 217, at 9.
224 Id.
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Professor Gould’s prescient view, a relativistic approach to judicial fact-finding about
the natural world was unwarranted and unwise because it would raise problems in
all areas of science—“we don’t require equal time for flat earthers and those who
believe that our planet resides at the center of the universe.”225
III. THE EDWARDS EFFECT
The Edwards message was not just clear—it was effective.226 Shortly after the
case was decided, the anti-evolution movement abandoned all vestiges of theistic rhet-
oric and embraced a new “scientized” approach. After Edwards, critiques of evolution
and competing origin theories would be framed, not as matters of faith, but as ques-
tions of science.
The switch from Creation Science to Intelligent Design227 was directly responsive
to Justice Brennan’s call for “scientific critiques of prevailing scientific theories.”228
Of Pandas and People, a fundamental Creation Science text then in draft form was
quickly revised after Edwards.229 Intelligent Design was now defined as the scientific
theory “that various forms of life began abruptly through an intelligent agency, with
their distinctive features already intact.”230 This definition replaced pre-1987 language
stating that “Creation means that various forms of life began abruptly through the
agency of an intelligent Creator with their distinctive features already intact.”231 The
excising of any reference to a “Creator” coincided with the development of the “Theory
of Irreducible Complexity.”232 Irreducible Complexity, a cornerstone of current Intel-
ligent Design theory, posits a scientific basis for a supernatural designer, because
a single system composed of several well-matched, interacting
parts that contribute to the basic function, wherein the removal
of any one of the parts causes the system to effectively cease
225 Id.
226 See FAIGMAN, supra note 185, at 26 (opining that Edwards illustrates a Supreme Court
trend of general reluctance “to delve too deeply into scientific matters” and this trend “has real
costs” and “creates an assortment of doctrinal problems”).
227 Pennock, supra note 48 (“Following the Supreme Court decision [in Edwards] in 1987,
creationists regrouped and rebranded their views as ‘Intelligent Design (ID) Theory.’”).
228 Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 593 (1987). Intelligent Design claims to differ from
Creationism in that Intelligent Design proponents profess not to identify the intelligent power
that guides the development of the universe. Intelligent Design is also more specifically rooted
in the premise that biological life is so “irreducibl[y] complex[ ]” that it cannot be the product
of natural selection. See Pennock, supra note 48.
229 Id.
230 Id. (quoting OF PANDAS AND PEOPLE 99–100 (1989)).
231 Id. (quoting OF PANDAS AND PEOPLE (draft pre-1987)).
232 Id.
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functioning . . . cannot be produced directly . . . by slight, succes-
sive modifications of a precursor system, because any precursor
to an irreducibly complex system that is missing a part is by def-
inition nonfunctional.233
After Edwards, “[i]ntelligent design’s proponents . . . [would] use only the language
of science.”234
Contemporary anti-evolution legal strategies originated as a “creationist program
to exploit language in the Supreme Court’s decision in Edwards v. Aguillard.”235 As
Professor Richard B. Katskee has observed in the wake of Edwards, “the intelligent
design movement has carefully (albeit superficially) crafted its beliefs to look like
science, in an effort to distinguish them from creationism and so-called creation
science—the precursors to intelligent design that the U.S. Supreme Court and the
lower federal courts long ago recognized as religious views.”236
Three decades after Edwards, the anti-evolution movement continues to create
a false controversy based on misstatements and misconceptions about science.
Edwards’s effects were apparent two decades later when then-President George W.
Bush announced that Intelligent Design should be taught in public school science
classrooms, because “[b]oth sides ought to be properly taught . . . so people can
understand what the debate is about.”237 More recently, Florida Senator Marco
Rubio advocated a similar epistemic relativism regarding climate change when he
said, “I’m not a scientist, man. . . . I can tell you what recorded history says, I can
tell you what the Bible says,”238 as did Texas Senator Ted Cruz, Chair of the Senate
Subcommittee on Space, Science, and Competitiveness, when he opined that climate
change “data [does] not support[ ] what the advocates are arguing.”239
233 MICHAEL J. BEHE, DARWIN’S BLACK BOX: THE BIOCHEMICAL CHALLENGE TO EVO-
LUTION 39 (1996).
234 Mooney & Nisbet, supra note 5 (quoting Jeffrey Brown on The News Hour with Jim
Lehrer).
235 Richard B. Katskee, Why it Mattered to Dover that Intelligent Design Isn’t Science,
5 FIRST AMEND. L. REV. 112, 119 (2006).
236 Id. at 114–15.
237 Peter Baker & Peter Slevin, Bush Remarks on ‘Intelligent Design’ Theory Fuel
Debate, WASH. POST (Aug. 3, 2005), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article
/2005/08/02/AR2005080201686.html [http://perma.cc/5WWQ-AN2F] (second alteration in
original).
238 Jake Miller, Rubio on Earth’s Age: “I’m Not a Scientist, Man,” CBS NEWS (Nov. 19,
2012, 5:30 PM), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/rubio-on-earths-age-im-not-a-scientist-man/
[http://perma.cc/6Q9T-MUQF].
239 Dana Bash & Deirdre Walsh, Cruz to CNN: Global Warming Not Supported by Data,
CNN: POLITICAL TICKER (Feb. 20, 2014, 6:10 PM), http://politicalticker.blogs.cnn.com/2014
/02/20/cruz-to-cnn-global-warming-not-supported-by-data/ [http://perma.cc/H57S-L3EE].
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Questions of what is, and what is not, a scientific theory or critique continue to
rankle school board elections,240 textbook modification debates,241 and other efforts
to set public school curricula.242 When these questions inevitably result in legal chal-
lenges, judges must engage in fact-finding to distinguish legitimate science from false
and manufactured controversies.
A. Copycat “Scientific Theories” and “Scientific Critique” from the
Anti-Abortion Movement
During the last quarter of the twentieth century, extralegal judicial fact-finding
about natural and social science would similarly transform the laws governing repro-
ductive rights. Abortion had first reached the Supreme Court the previous decade in
Roe v. Wade.243 Prior to Roe, in the early 1970s, much of the public and numerous state
legislatures supported safe and legal abortion under certain circumstances.244 In
1967, for example, Colorado became the first state to decriminalize abortion, al-
though only in cases of rape, incest, or if pregnancy would lead to permanent phys-
ical disability.245 In 1971, the Supreme Court upheld a Washington, D.C. abortion
law, finding that the “health” of the mother included her “psychological as well as
physical well-being,” which might be protected by providing access to safe and legal
abortion.246 By the time Roe was decided two years later, twelve additional states had
passed laws decriminalizing abortion.247
240 Jessica Brown, Common Core Bill Sparks Creationism Debate in Ohio, USA TODAY
(Aug. 23, 2014, 7:01 PM), http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2014/08/23/common
-core-bill-sparks-creationism-debate-in-ohio/14507351/ [http://perma.cc/KQ8V-UUV6].
241 Martha Kempner, A Textbook Case: The Continuing Battle for Control over What
Students Read, REPROD. & SEXUAL HEALTH & JUST. (Dec. 19, 2014, 2:23 PM), http://rhreality
check.org/article/2014/12/19/textbook-case-continuing-battle-for-control-over-students-read/
[http://perma.cc/AY5U-WSZF].
242 Bruce Maiman, Opinion, Using Schoolkids to Promote Religion Is a Shameless Ploy,
SACRAMENTO BEE (Dec. 29, 2014), http://www.sacbee.com/opinion/op-ed/bruce-maiman
/article5131995.html [http://perma.cc/48WS-GJBH].
243 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
244 See Linda Greenhouse & Reva B. Siegel, Before (and After) Roe v. Wade: New Questions
About Backlash, 120 YALE L.J. 2028, 2081 n.183 (2010) (explaining that popular support for
legal abortion was on the rise before Roe).
245 Our History, PLANNED PARENTHOOD ROCKY MOUNTAINS, INC., http://www.planned
parenthood.org/planned-parenthood-rocky-mountains/who-we-are/our-history [http://perma
.cc/4X44-FV84].
246 United States v. Vuitch, 402 U.S. 62, 72 (1971).
247 See Greenhouse & Siegel, supra note 244, at 2047 (listing these states as Colorado,
North Carolina, California, Maryland, Georgia, Arkansas, Delaware, New Mexico, Kansas,
Oregon, South Carolina, and Virginia).
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1. The Medical Science of Fetal Viability
The Roe Court’s famous trimester framework would encourage future judicial
fact-finding on questions of medical science.248 According to Justice Blackmun, given
the State’s important and legitimate interest in the health of the
mother, the “compelling” point, in the light of present medical
knowledge, is at approximately the end of the first trimester . . .
because of the now-established medical fact . . . that until the
end of the first trimester mortality in abortion may be less than
mortality in normal childbirth.249
Under Roe, these interests must sometimes cede to “the State’s important and legit-
imate interest in potential life, [and] the ‘compelling’ point is at viability . . . because
the fetus then presumably has the capability of meaningful life outside the mother’s
womb.”250 As many historians have pointed out, Justice Blackmun’s scientized ap-
proach may be attributable to his previous experience as legal counsel to the Mayo
Clinic and the fact that he had returned to Minnesota the summer before deciding Roe
to extensively research the medical questions.251
A medical approach to reproductive legal rights issues was not inevitable. In
Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg’s view, the Roe Court’s medical science approach was
both unnecessary and unfortunate.252 According to Justice Ginsburg, the Court could
have avoided fact-finding about medical science if the decision had instead rested
on equal protection considerations of women’s autonomy and equality.253 Professor
Linda Greenhouse, upon the recent occasion of Roe’s fortieth anniversary, similarly
opined that “[t]o read the actual opinion, as almost no one ever does, is to understand
that the seven middle-aged to elderly men in the majority certainly didn’t think they
were making a statement about women’s rights: women and their voices are nearly
absent from the opinion.”254 But Justice Blackmun’s decision in Roe defined the
248 Roe, 410 U.S. at 149 (referencing “medical data indicating that abortion in early
pregnancy, that is, prior to the end of the first trimester, although not without its risk, is now
relatively safe” and that “[m]ortality rates for women undergoing early abortions, where the
procedure is legal, appear to be as low as or lower than the rates for normal childbirth”).
249 Id. at 163.
250 Id.
251 JANICE SCHUETZ, COMMUNICATING THE LAW: LESSONS FROM LANDMARK LEGAL
CASES 300 (2007).
252 Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Some Thoughts on Autonomy and Equality in Relation to Roe v.
Wade, 63 N.C. L. REV. 375, 382 (1985).
253 See id. at 385 (insisting the Court should have “acknowledged a woman’s equality
aspect, not simply a patient-physician autonomy constitutional dimension to the abortion issue”).
254 Linda Greenhouse, Misconceptions, N.Y. TIMES: OPINIONATOR (Jan. 23, 2013, 9:00 PM),
http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/01/23/misconceptions/.
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shifting state interest in regulating abortion using pregnancy trimesters.255 With this
medical framework in place, abortion opponents have found increasing traction for
Edwards-style restrictions based on “scientific theories” and “scientific critique.”
2. The Psychological Effects of Unwanted Pregnancy and Abortion
Extralegal judicial fact-finding after Roe principally involved the medical evi-
dence of fetal development.256 Even before Roe, however, the Court had also begun
to consider the mental health implications of an unwanted pregnancy. In 1971, in
United States v. Vuitch,257 the Supreme Court rejected a challenge to a Washington,
D.C. law permitting abortions “necessary for the preservation of the mother’s life or
health and [performed] under the direction of a competent licensed practitioner of
medicine,”258 based on the alleged imprecision of the word “health.”259 According to
the Vuitch Court, “the legislative history of the statute [gave] no guidance as to
whether ‘health’ refers to both a patient’s mental and physical state,”260 but the term
presented no problem of vagueness because an abortion could have been necessary
to protect a “patient’s physical or mental health.”261 In the Court’s progressive view,
this was precisely the type of “judgment that physicians [were] obviously called
upon to make routinely.”262
Two years later in Roe, Justice Blackmun engaged in similar extralegal judicial
fact-finding about maternal mental health. The Roe Court found that “[t]he detriment
that the State would impose upon the pregnant woman by denying this choice [of
an abortion] altogether is apparent.”263 According to the Court,
[s]pecific and direct harm medically diagnosable even in early
pregnancy may be involved. Maternity, or additional offspring,
may force upon the woman a distressful life and future. Psycho-
logical harm may be imminent. Mental and physical health may
be taxed by child care. There is also the distress, for all concerned,
associated with the unwanted child, and there is the problem of
255 See Roe, 410 U.S. at 162–63 (describing how the trimester framework is directly related
to the state’s interest in maternal health).
256 See, e.g., Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914, 921 (2000) (holding a law unconstitutional
based on medical evidence of the fetal development).
257 402 U.S. 62 (1971).
258 Id. at 68 (citing D.C. CODE ANN. § 22-201 (West 1967)).
259 Id.
260 Id. at 71.
261 Id. at 72.
262 Id.
263 Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973).
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bringing a child into a family already unable, psychologically and
otherwise, to care for it.264
The Court would continue to engage in fact-finding about human psychology and be-
havior in all subsequent abortion cases. But over time, American Citizens Concerned
for Life and other abortion opponents would invert the argument. In subsequent cases,
the courts rejected or ignored the deleterious psychological impact of unwanted preg-
nancy and focused instead on a range of scientifically unsubstantiated assumptions
regarding post-abortion trauma.265
3. The Post-Roe Decade
Fact-finding about medical science has dominated Supreme Court abortion juris-
prudence in the wake of the Roe Court’s finding that “a State may properly assert im-
portant interests in safeguarding health [and] in maintaining medical standards.”266
Three years later, in Planned Parenthood of Central Missouri v. Danforth,267 the Court
explored whether specific restrictions were “reasonably directed to the preservation
of maternal health.”268 Abortion opponents had advanced various “scientific theories”
to support new abortion restrictions. Justice Blackmun, writing again for the majority,
took an erratic approach to the epistemic questions. He upheld an informed consent
provision based on the empirically unsupported assumption that “[t]he decision to
abort, indeed, is an important, and often a stressful one, and it is desirable and imper-
ative that it be made with full knowledge of its nature and consequences.”269 How-
ever, the Court rejected a statewide ban on saline amniocentesis after weighing the
scientific evidence and concluding that the procedure was safe and widely used.270
264 Id.
265 See Caroline Mala Corbin, Abortion Distortions, 71 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1175,
1175–76 (2014) (noting that despite the fact that “no reputable study supports” a causal link
between abortion and depression, “this unfounded assertion has been used to justify laws
requiring that women seeking abortion be provided with certain information lest they later
suffer from postabortion trauma”).
266 Roe, 410 U.S. at 154.
267 428 U.S. 52 (1976).
268 Id. at 80.
269 Id. at 67. But see Harper Jean Tobin, Confronting Misinformation on Abortion: Informed
Consent, Deference, and Fetal Pain Laws, 17 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 111, 111 (2008)
(“These laws abandon well-settled principles of informed consent—which give discretion
to medical professionals to determine what information is crucial for patients—in favor of
legislative judgments about what particular facts should be told to patients and how these
facts should be shared.”).
270 Danforth, 428 U.S. at 78–79 (holding that the ban on saline was not a reasonable regu-
lation in light of the state’s interest in maternal health).
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In 1983, in Planned Parenthood Association of Kansas City v. Ashcroft,271 abortion
opponents had advanced the “scientific theories” that a second physician for post-
viability abortions and pathology examinations was a necessary medical safeguard.
In this case, Justice Powell, writing for the majority, took a more consistent approach
to the epistemic questions.272 The Court concluded that both restrictions advanced
legitimate maternal health and safety interests.273 According to the majority, the sec-
ond doctor could “be of assistance to the woman’s physician in preserving the health
and life of the child,”274 and the pathology examination could be “‘useful and even
necessary in some cases,’ because ‘abnormalities in the tissue may warn of serious,
possibly fatal disorders.’”275 Later that same year, in City of Akron v. Akron Center
for Reproductive Health, Inc.,276 Justice Powell, writing for the majority, rejected a
twenty-four-hour delay and a requirement that all abortions after the first trimester be
performed in a hospital.277 The medical fact-finding in this case included the Court’s
rejection of the state’s assertion that “abortion is a major surgical procedure.”278
Following a review of the purported medical theories advanced by the state, the Court
concluded that the empirical evidence had failed to establish that mandated hospital-
ization advanced maternal health and safety.279
4. The Roe Backlash
The immediate political backlash against Roe has been a frequent topic of academic
debate.280 Richard Posner has described public outrage at the Roe Court’s overreaching
to create a national abortion policy for deeply divided states.281 Cass Sunstein has ad-
vanced the bolder claim that Roe “may well have created the Moral Majority, helped
defeat the equal rights amendment, and undermined the women’s movement by spur-
ring opposition and demobilizing potential adherents.”282 But other commentators
271 462 U.S. 476 (1983).
272 Id. at 477.
273 Id. at 485–86, 490.
274 Id. at 485.
275 Id. at 487 (quoting Planned Parenthood Ass’n of Kan. City v. Ashcroft, 655 F.2d 848,
870 (8th Cir. 1981)).
276 462 U.S. 416 (1983).
277 Id. at 452.
278 Id. at 444 (quoting Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, Inc. v. Akron, 479 F. Supp. 1172,
1203 (N.D. Ohio 1979)).
279 Id. at 437, 450.
280 See, e.g., John Nivala, Planned Parenthood v. Casey: The Death of Repose in Repro-
ductive Decisionmaking, 4 SETON HALL CONST. L.J. 47, 67 (1993) (“Roe predictably fueled
reaction and resistance.”).
281 See, e.g., RICHARD POSNER, LAW, PRAGMATISM, AND DEMOCRACY 124–25 (2003)
(critiquing Roe for precluding a more democratic approach to abortion).
282 Cass R. Sunstein, Three Civil Rights Fallacies, 79 CALIF. L. REV. 751, 766 (1991).
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disagree, opining that the advent of the anti-abortion movement is not so easily
explained. Reva Siegel has argued that Roe instead illustrates an academic debate
with little immediate public consequence, noting that “jurisprudential objection by
itself is rarely sufficient to inspire a political movement capable of altering the com-
plexion of constitutional politics.”283 In Professor Siegel’s view, scholarly speculations
overestimating the force and extent of a Roe backlash fail to “distinguish between
claims that function as jurisprudential objections within professional debate and claims
that function as political arguments within popular debate.”284
Roe would, of course, eventually mobilize abortion opponents. As discussed
above, the Supreme Court decided several abortion cases over the post-Roe decade.
But outside the courthouse, the contemporaneous anti-abortion movement had not
yet divided the country along partisan lines. In the wake of Roe, anti-abortion stra-
tegic decision-making remained in the hands of religious groups less familiar with
lobbying and marketing strategies than their political counterparts.285 In fact, two years
after Roe, a Harris Survey reported that over half of the country favored legal abor-
tions under any circumstances during the first trimester.286 Public support for access
to legal abortion remained relatively steady from 1975 to 1990, and membership in
the Republican or Democratic Party was not a good indicator of abortion views.287
As annual Gallup polls reveal, public support for legal first-trimester abortion under
any circumstances fluctuated between 18%–29% among Republicans and 19%–34%
among Democrats from 1975 to 1990.288
Fifteen post-Roe years of steady bipartisan support for legal abortion “under any
circumstances” belie any immediate grassroots backlash.289 The fight over reproduc-
tive rights would not fully divide the country along partisan lines until two decades
later—after pro-life Supreme Court nominee Robert Bork was defeated in 1987290
and pro-choice President Bill Clinton was elected in 1992.291
Unlike the anti-evolution movement, the anti-abortion movement reflects a top-
down effort to realign the strategic interests of the Republican Party,292 with economics
283 Robert Post & Reva Siegel, Roe Rage: Democratic Constitutionalism and Backlash,
42 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 373, 410 (2007).
284 Id.
285 Id. at 412–13.
286 Greenhouse & Siegel, supra note 244, at 2081 n.183 (citing Louis Harris, Majority
Supporting Abortion Laws Grows, CHI. TRIB., May 26, 1975, at 7).
287 Lydia Saad, Republicans’, Dems’ Abortion Views Grow More Polarized, GALLUP
(Mar. 8, 2010), http://www.gallup.com/poll/126374/republicans-dems-abortion-views-grow
-polarized.aspx.
288 Id.
289 Id.; see also Mary Ziegler, Beyond Backlash: Legal History, Polarization, and Roe v.
Wade, 71 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 969, 971 (2014).
290 LINDA GREENHOUSE & REVA B. SIEGEL, BEFORE ROE V. WADE: VOICES THAT SHAPED
THE ABORTION DEBATE BEFORE THE SUPREME COURT’S RULING 260 (2012).
291 Post & Siegel, supra note 283, at 428 n.243.
292 Greenhouse & Siegel, supra note 244, at 2083.
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playing an important role. The financial incentives have been revealed in new research
demonstrating that, over the post-Roe decade, “[o]rganizations like the Moral Majority
and Christian Voice had an impressive financial record,” but the National Right to Life
Committee (NRLC), “the largest national pro-life organization, had debts.”293 Thus,
a strategic alignment with “social conservatives promised to make the pro-life cause
financially stable.”294
In June 1992, the Supreme Court decided Planned Parenthood of Southeastern
Pennsylvania v. Casey.295 In a five-to-four opinion authored by Justices O’Connor,
Kennedy, and Souter, Casey reaffirmed the “essential holding” of Roe, including the
requirement that any abortion restrictions include an exception to accommodate post-
viability abortions necessary to preserve the life or health of the mother.296 However,
the Court rejected Roe’s trimester framework, replacing it with the requirement that
state law not place an “undue burden on a woman’s constitutional right to decide to
terminate a pregnancy.”297 The Court’s failure to overturn Roe disappointed the grow-
ing anti-abortion movement. But the new abortion framework would eventually
prove useful to abortion opponents. After Casey, the anti-abortion movement, like the
anti-evolution movement a decade earlier, “uncertain about the extent to which they
can openly profess ideological grounds for abortion laws, . . . [would] instead pres-
ent abortion restrictions as rooted in medical and scientific concerns.”298 Thus, Casey’s
“undue burden test” would open the door to Edwards-style anti-abortion “scientific
theories” and “scientific critiques” deployed by a growing coalition of religious,
social, and political organizations.
B. “Partial-Birth Abortion”
Starting in the early 1990s, abortion opponents began to gain traction with the
public, media, legislators, and courts. The National Right to Life Committee (NRLC),
in particular, began to focus more closely on the science.299 Led by NRLC, abortion
opponents quickly settled on a new strategy.300 In September 1992, Dr. Martin
Haskell, a Cincinnati family practitioner and abortion provider, presented an
293 Ziegler, supra note 289, at 1008.
294 Id.
295 505 U.S. 833 (1992) (invalidating the state’s spousal-notification requirement, but
upholding: informed-consent requirements, a twenty-four-hour waiting period, a requirement
that minors obtain parental consent of at least one parent, and extensive new state reporting
requirements for all abortion-providing facilities).
296 Id. at 846.
297 Id. at 838.
298 Caitlin E. Borgmann, Judicial Evasion and Disingenuous Legislative Appeals to Science
in the Abortion Controversy, 17 J.L. & POL’Y 15, 33 (2008).
299 Julie Rovner, ‘Partial Birth Abortion:’ Separating Fact from Spin, NPR, http://www
.npr.org/2006/02/21/5168163/partial-birth-abortion-separating-fact-from-spin (last updated
Aug. 1, 2012, 6:03 PM).
300 Id.
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unpublished seminar paper at a National Abortion Federation meeting.301 In this
paper, Dr. Haskell
described in full medical detail a procedure he used for late
second-trimester abortions that differed significantly from the
standard second-trimester procedure of dilation and evacuation,
or “D&E” [by] remov[ing] the fetus as intact as possible, and he
introduced the new name dilation and extraction, or “D&X,” for
his procedure.302
Dr. Haskell’s unpublished work came to the attention of the NRLC, which quickly
recognized its marketing potential and “commissioned drawings to illustrate it and
published them in booklet form, as well as placing them as paid advertisements in
newspapers to build public opposition.”303 So-called “partial-birth abortion” pre-
sented the anti-abortion movement with a scientific-sounding argument that could be
deployed to encourage new restrictions on this procedure and perhaps on other pro-
cedures as well. As then–NRLC Legislative Director Douglas Johnson explained after-
wards, when “the public learns what a ‘partial-birth abortion’ is, they might also learn
something about other abortion methods, and that this would foster a growing oppo-
sition to abortion.”304
Three years later, Florida Republican Representative Charles T. Canady introduced
the federal Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act of 1995.305 The law authorized up to two
years in prison for any doctor performing an abortion who “partially vaginally de-
livers a living fetus before killing the fetus and completing the delivery.”306 Partial-
birth abortion quickly became the signature “scientific” issue for abortion opponents
and was featured prominently in national media coverage.307 Polling data revealed that
“partial birth abortion” mobilized Republicans to oppose abortion308 and raised much-
needed funds for anti-abortion organizations.309 The shift to an argument based on a
301 See David J. Garrow, Significant Risks: Gonzales v. Carhart and the Future of Abortion
Law, 2007 SUP. CT. REV. 1, 2 (describing Dr. Haskell’s paper presentation).
302 See id.
303 See Rovner, supra note 299.
304 Id.
305 H.R. REP. NO. 104-267 (1995), http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CRPT-104hrpt267/html
/CRPT-104hrpt267.htm [http://perma.cc/UAS3-XE6S]; see also Debra Rosenberg, Chipping
Away at Roe, NEWSWEEK (Mar. 16, 2003, 7:00 PM), http://www.newsweek.com/chipping
-away-roe-133053 [http://perma.cc/BS8U-A3T6].
306 H.R. REP. NO. 104-267, § 1531(b) (1995).
307 Garrow, supra note 301, at 4 (noting that the phrase “partial-birth abortion” was
immediately featured in newspapers throughout the United States).
308 See Greenhouse & Siegel, supra note 244, at 2011 (noting that, once Republicans voted
against abortion in Congress, data began showing they opposed it more than Democrats).
309 See Ziegler, supra note 289, at 1008.
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“scientific critique” of abortion mirrored recent Intelligent Design efforts focused
on the “scientific critique” of irreducible complexity310 and marked a “turning point
in the abortion debate” that would soon “put the abortion-rights proponents . . . on the
political defensive” on questions of medicine and maternal mental health.311
State efforts to ban partial-birth abortion procedures followed quickly—despite
the fact that the late-term procedure was relatively uncommon, and, in some states
seeking criminalization, had never once been performed.312 In 1997, the American
College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists (ACOG)313 and the American Medical
Association (AMA)314 issued public statements demanding that doctors maintain the
legal discretion to use this procedure when it was in the patient’s best interest. Offi-
cial pronouncements from leading medical organizations were intended to advance the
mainstream medical view that intact dilation and extraction should not be outlawed.315
But public attention from the ACOG and AMA paradoxically helped abortion oppo-
nents maintain their purported focus on this “scientific critique.” This strategy was
designed to encourage judicial fact-finding based on epistemic relativism and deflect
attention from partisan, normative, or theological objections.316
310 See Borgmann, supra note 298, at 26–27 (noting the comparison between the abortion
debate and evolution debate).
311 Garrow, supra note 301, at 4.
312 John Gibeaut, Strategic Adjustments: Abortion Opponents Focusing on Protection of
the “Partially Born,” 85 A.B.A. J. 26, 26 (1999).
313 According to the ACOG, their members
could identify no circumstances under which this procedure [intact D
& X] would be the only option to save the life or preserve the health of
the woman[,] . . . [although it] may be the best or most appropriate pro-
cedure in a particular circumstance to save the life or preserve the health
of a woman, and only the doctor, in consultation with the patient, based
upon the woman’s particular circumstances can make this decision.
AM. COLL. OF OBSTETRICIANS & GYNECOLOGISTS, ABORTION POLICY (2011) [hereinafter
ABORTION POLICY] (emphasis added).
314 According to AMA, among the
scientific literature, there does not appear to be any identified situation
in which intact D&X is the only appropriate procedure to induce abor-
tion, and ethical concerns have been raised about intact D&X. The AMA
recommends that the procedure not be used unless alternative proce-
dures pose materially greater risk to the woman. The physician must,
however, retain the discretion to make that judgment, acting within stan-
dards of good medical practice and in the best interest of the patient.
AM. MED. ASS’N, H-5.982(2): Late-Term Pregnancy Termination Techniques, in HEALTH AND
ETHICS POLICIES OF THE AMA HOUSE OF DELEGATES, http://www.ama-assn.org/ad-com/pol
find/Hlth-Ethics.pdf [http://perma.cc/ZTX7-BQTD].
315 Id.; see also ABORTION POLICY, supra note 313, at 2–3 (informing reader of the medical
process of intact D&X).
316 Rigel E. Oliveri, Crossing the Line: The Political and Moral Battle over Late-Term
Abortion, 10 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 397, 398 (1998) (noting the “intense lobbying efforts
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C. Medical Fact-Finding on Partial-Birth Abortion: Stenberg v. Carhart
The Nebraska statute prohibiting “intact dilation and extraction” reached the
Supreme Court in 2000 in Stenberg v. Carhart.317 Justice Breyer, who wrote for the
majority, immediately announced that scientific fact-finding about the safety and
medical necessity of this particular abortion procedure would guide the Court’s legal
analysis.318 According to the Court,
[b]ecause Nebraska law seeks to ban one method of aborting a
pregnancy, we must describe and then discuss several different
abortion procedures. Considering the fact that those procedures
seek to terminate a potential human life, our discussion may
seem clinically cold or callous to some, perhaps horrifying to
others. There is no alternative way, however, to acquaint the
reader with the technical distinctions among different abortion
methods and related factual matters, upon which the outcome of
this case depends.319
The issue was “whether Nebraska’s statute, making criminal the performance
of a ‘partial birth abortion,’ violates the Federal Constitution, as interpreted in Planned
Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey,”320 by placing an “undue burden on a
woman’s ability to choose an abortion.”321 Following a detailed review of the extensive
medical evidence regarding the safety and necessity of the intact dilation and extraction
procedure, the Court concluded that the Nebraska law, which contained an exception
to preserve the life of the mother but no exception to protect her health, “create[d] a
significant health risk.”322 The decision, according to Justice Breyer, was also based
both on the empirical evidence and on fact-finding by the district court that intact
dilation and extraction “significantly obviates health risks in certain circumstances
on the part of both proponents and opponents of the bill, resulting in a fierce ethical, medical,
political, and social debate that shows no signs of diminishing”).
317 530 U.S. 914, 928–30 (2000).
318 Id. at 923.
319 Id.
320 Id. at 929–30.
321 Id. at 916 (citation omitted). According to the majority,
[c]onsequently, the governing standard requires an exception “where
it is necessary, in appropriate medical judgment for the preservation of
the life or health of the mother,” for this Court has made clear that a State
may promote but not endanger a woman’s health when it regulates the
methods of abortion.
Id. at 931 (citations omitted).
322 Id. at 937–38.
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[based on] a highly plausible record-based explanation of why that might be so.”323
The majority also noted that, “[w]ith one exception, the federal trial courts that have
heard expert evidence on the matter have reached similar factual conclusions.”324
The Stenberg decision invalidated identical partial-birth abortion bans in thirty
states, igniting a storm of anti-abortion protests.325 Heralded as the case that saved
Roe, the Court’s reliance on medical fact-finding initially appeared to expand the
scope of states’ responsibilities to protect women’s health.
In identifying an explicit statutory health exception as a sine qua
non of abortion restrictions whenever substantial medical author-
ity deemed one necessary, the Stenberg Court headed off a key
strategy of abortion rights opponents, who have long sought to
narrow the application of the health rationale and downplay the
importance of access to abortion for women’s health.326
This possibility was not lost on Justice Thomas, who wrote for the four dissenters.327
Unsurprisingly, the dissenters had engaged in their own scientific fact-finding under
Casey, reaching the conclusion that a complete ban was warranted.328 According to
Justice Thomas, “[i]f there is a ‘significant body of medical opinion’ supporting this
procedure, no one in the majority has identified it.”329 The dissenters expressed their
specific concern that future abortion challenges would now fail whenever “any doc-
tor could reasonably believe that the partial birth abortion procedure would best pro-
tect the woman,”330 or “because some doctors believe that partial birth abortion is
safer.”331 This would be the last word on abortion from the Court for the remainder
of the century.
IV. EXTRALEGAL JUDICIAL FACT-FINDING IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY
For the last two decades of the twentieth century, the anti-evolution movement
charted a path forward in the wake of Edwards v. Aguillard, which has transformed
323 Id. at 936.
324 Id. at 932.
325 Cynthia D. Lockett, The Beginning of the End: The Diminished Abortion Right Fol-
lowing Carhart and Planned Parenthood, 11 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 337, 344–45 (2008).
326 Linda J. Wharton et al., Preserving the Core of Roe: Reflections on Planned Parenthood
v. Casey, 18 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 317, 347 (2006) (footnote omitted).
327 Stenberg, 530 U.S. at 1017 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
328 Id. at 1017–18.
329 Id. at 1017.
330 Id.
331 Id. at 1012.
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public debate on reproductive rights and other important science and law controver-
sies. Recently, the anti-evolution and anti-abortion movements’ paths have diverged.
The “scientific theories” and “scientific critique” of Intelligent Design continue to
amass significant public support.332 However, a decade after these empirical claims
were rejected in Kitzmiller v. Dover Area School District,333 there have been no new
federal legal challenges. In contrast, the Supreme Court continues to advance “scien-
tific theories” further restricting abortion access, most recently in 2007 in Gonzales
v. Carhart.334 A comparison of twenty-first century extralegal judicial fact-finding
provides insight for future cases in these and other science-focused legal debates.
A. Recent Anti-Evolution Developments
1. Accurate Judicial Fact-Finding About Evolution: Kitzmiller v. Dover Area
School District
Kitzmiller v. Dover Area School District, decided in December 2005, is the only
twenty-first-century anti-evolution challenge to reach the federal courts.335 In Kitzmiller,
Judge John E. Jones, III, addressed the constitutionality of a Pennsylvania school board
requirement that all public high school science teachers read a statement to their biol-
ogy classes explaining that: (1) “Darwin’s Theory is a theory . . . [that] continues to
be tested as new evidence is discovered”;336 (2) “The Theory is not a fact”;337 (3) “Gaps
in the Theory exist for which there is no evidence”;338 (4) “Intelligent Design is an ex-
planation of the origin of life that differs from Darwin’s view”;339 and (5) Students
should read “[t]he reference book, Of Pandas and People, [which] is available for stu-
dents who might be interested in gaining an understanding of what Intelligent Design
actually involves.”340
Kitzmiller, which attracted significant media attention, was the first time that
the intelligent-design movement as a whole stood trial on the
claim that they were trying to pass off a religious view as though
it were a scientific theory, so that they could market it to students
in public-school science classrooms. They defended themselves
by saying that they were doing nothing dishonest, much less
332 See infra notes 363–70 and accompanying text.
333 400 F. Supp. 2d 707 (M.D. Pa. 2005).
334 550 U.S. 124 (2007).
335 400 F. Supp. 2d at 707.
336 Id. at 708.
337 Id.
338 Id.
339 Id. at 708–09.
340 Id. at 709.
498 WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL [Vol. 24:451
unconstitutional, because intelligent design is a scientific theory
that belongs in science classes.341
After an eight-week trial and application of the same Lemon test applied by the Su-
preme Court two decades earlier in Edwards v. Aguillard,342 Judge Jones found that
the school board policy violated the Establishment Clause.343
Edwards and Kitzmiller involved similar facts and identical Establishment
Clause standards.344 But the scope and depth of the two courts’ extralegal fact-
finding about the natural world could not be more different. Judge Jones fully em-
braced the epistemology of science questions ignored by the Edwards Court, devot-
ing a substantial portion of his fifty-nine page opinion to an explicit description of
how and why Intelligent Design could never be legitimate science.345 Judge Jones’s
approach also acknowledged that the world outside the courthouse had changed—
with “scientized” Intelligent Design arguments providing a model of apparent ob-
jectivity for other partisan, normative, or theistic debates.346 As Professor Richard
Katskee persuasively argued, “[D]eciding whether intelligent design is science was
critical to the Kitzmiller court’s fulfilling its jurisprudential obligation both to the
defendants and to the public at large.”347
2. Understanding the New Judicial Approach
The science law discussion embodied in Kitzmiller acknowledged the public’s
increasing difficulties distinguishing science from its counterfeits—especially when
so many arguments on the internet and elsewhere sound scientific. To help delineate
science from pseudoscience and avoid epistemic relativism on threshold questions
341 Katskee, supra note 235, at 112.
342 482 U.S. 578, 585 (1987). The Edwards Court relied on the three-pronged Lemon test,
which requires that: (1) the legislature had a secular purpose when it adopted the statute; (2) the
statute’s primary effect does not inhibit or advance religion; and (3) the statute does not create
excessive entanglement between government and religion. See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S.
602, 612–13 (1971).
343 Kitzmiller, 400 F. Supp. 2d at 765.
344 See Edwards, 482 U.S. at 578 (holding that Louisiana’s “Creationism Act” violated the
Establishment Clause); Kitzmiller, 400 F. Supp. 2d at 707–08 (holding that the school board
provision violated the Establishment Clause).
345 See Kitzmiller, 400 F. Supp. 2d at 737.
346 See id. at 717–18. It is worth noting that at least one commentator, Jay Wexler, has
suggested that, from a First Amendment perspective, Judge Jones should not have ventured
into the “What is science?” debate. See Jay D. Wexler, Kitzmiller and the “Is it Science?”
Question, 5 FIRST AMEND. L. REV. 90, 106 (2006) (“[A]ny judge who wants to engage in a
demarcation inquiry should first explain why he or she is in fact competent to define science
and to apply that definition. Certainly Judge Jones did not make this affirmative case before
engaging in his own demarcation analysis.”).
347 Katskee, supra note 235, at 115.
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of scientific evidence and fact, the court provided a lengthy discussion of the hallmarks
of legitimate scientific inquiry.
Judge Jones began by explaining that real science is “limited to empirical, observ-
able and ultimately testable data”348 and that science should never be mistaken for
pseudoscience because pseudoscientific explanations “attribut[e] unsolved problems
about nature to causes and forces that lie outside the natural world . . . [and are thus]
a ‘science stopper.’”349 The court identified genuine areas of relevant scientific
consensus and explained how peer review and publication in peer-review scientific
journals can be indicia of scientific legitimacy.350 Judge Jones described the central-
ity of falsifiability to any legitimate scientific theory.351 He also rejected the argument
that Darwin’s theory of evolution is not perfect, noting “the fact that a scientific
theory cannot yet render an explanation on every point should not be used as a
pretext to thrust an untestable alternative hypothesis grounded in religion into the
science classroom or to misrepresent well-established scientific propositions.”352 Based
on this extensive extrajudicial fact-finding, Judge Jones concluded that Intelligent
Design could never be science because it is “not testable by the methods of science”
and it “subordinate[s] observed data to statements based on authority, revelation, or
religious belief.”353
The bulk of the Kitzmiller opinion reads like a primer on basic scientific principles.
Judge Jones could have simply concluded, as the Edwards Court had, that the Estab-
lishment Clause had been violated under the Lemon test,354 and some commentators
would have preferred that approach.355 Instead, the court went to great lengths to, in
Judge Jones’s words, assure the world that “[i]n making this determination, we have
addressed the seminal question of whether [Intelligent Design] is science.”356
3. Judicial Policy-Making Advances Accurate Science and Science Policy
Kitzmiller, decided in the spotlight of national media attention, illustrates Judge
Jones’s commitment to presenting an accurate epistemology of science that did not
falsely equate religious beliefs with “scientific theory” or “scientific critique.” In
his view,
the defendants, the people of Dover, and the whole country had
a right to expect him to issue a decisive ruling that would not
348 Kitzmiller, 400 F. Supp. 2d at 735.
349 Id. at 736 (emphasis added).
350 Id. at 744–45.
351 Id.
352 Id. at 765.
353 Id. at 737.
354 Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 593 (1987).
355 See, e.g., Wexler, supra note 346, at 106.
356 Kitzmiller, 400 F. Supp. 2d at 765.
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only resolve the dispute in Dover, but also give guidance to
other public-school officials elsewhere, and in the process forge
a common understanding that would begin to heal the religiously
based political and social divides that . . . the intelligent-design
movement was attempting to export to other communities across
the country.357
But the Kitzmiller court’s approach to the “What is science?” question was not an
unqualified success. The decision was quickly branded as judicial activism, a naked
power grab by the “Neo-Darwinian paradigm.”358 It was also condemned, using
academic freedom language, as a judicial attempt to “define the boundaries of
science . . . [to] hinder scientific progress.”359 More temperate critics opined that the
real issue “is not whether ID actually is science—a question that sounds in philoso-
phy of science—but rather whether judges should be deciding in their written opin-
ions that ID is or is not science as a matter of law.” According to one such critic,
“the answer is ‘no.’”360
In subsequent interviews, Judge Jones has explained his objectives: “I understand
the criticisms that were lodged against me, [but] [t]he decision seems to be holding
up well. . . . No other school district has engaged in this kind of a battle. I hope that’s
a product of the decision and perhaps the way that I wrote the decision.”361 He has also
expressed hope that Kitzmiller would deter future efforts to equate Intelligent Design
with “scientific” theory or critique, because “if a school board anywhere in the coun-
try does want to consider adding intelligent design in the curriculum, they need only
look at . . . [the] written decision.”362
4. Anticipating Consequences
A decade after Kitzmiller, the decision’s long-term effects are uncertain. Despite
mounting scientific evidence, many Americans reject evolution.363 As of 2014, 31%
believe in Intelligent Design and 46% believe in Creationism.364 Recent empirical
357 Katskee, supra note 235, at 116.
358 Brief for Biologists and Other Scientists as Amici Curiae in Support of Defendants at
9, Kitzmiller, 400 F. Supp. 2d 707 (No. 4:04-CV-2688), 2005 WL 3136712.
359 Id. at 1.
360 Wexler, supra note 346, at 93.
361 Andrew Shaw, After 5 Years, Dover Intelligent Design Ruling’s Impact Still Felt, YORK
DISPATCH (Dec. 17, 2010, 10:46 AM), http://www.yorkdispatch.com/ci_16883908 [http://
perma.cc/2HFR-F4BP] (third alteration in original).
362 Id.
363 See infra note 364 and accompanying text.
364 See Green, supra note 71 (a 2014 Gallup poll found that only 19% of Americans said
they believe in evolution, while 31% said they believe in Intelligent Design and 46% said
they believe in Creationism); see also Miller et al., supra note 71, at 765 (finding that 40%
of surveyed Americans accept the idea of evolution).
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research and new anti-evolution efforts to alter science curricula suggest that it is only
a matter of time before the next constitutional challenge.365
In an extensive study of public school science curricula published in 2011 in
Science magazine, Michael B. Berkman and Eric Plutzer found that state curricular
science standards have generally improved.366 But their research also revealed “that sup-
porters of evolution, scientific methods, and reason itself are losing battles in America’s
classrooms, where instruction in evolutionary biology ‘has been absent, cursory, or
fraught with misinformation.’”367 Data gathered from nearly one thousand high school
biology teachers “reveal a pervasive reluctance of teachers to forthrightly explain
evolutionary biology”368 and “a cycle of ignorance in which community antievolution
attitudes are perpetuated by teaching that reinforces local community sentiment.”369
Based on their research, the authors concluded that “[t]he next generation of adults
is thus predisposed to share the antievolution views of their parents.”370
Kitzmiller initially appeared to deter anti-evolution curricular reforms. More
recent developments in various states suggest, a decade later, that, the decision’s ef-
fects are eroding. In Ohio, two months after Kitzmiller was decided, the school
board of education voted down a preexisting requirement that an Intelligent Design-
style “critical analysis of evolution” be included in the state’s high school biology
curriculum.371 At the time, the school board “stripped the language from the curricu-
lum partly out of fear of a lawsuit in the wake of [the Kitzmiller] . . . ruling by a fed-
eral judge that teaching intelligent design in the Dover, Pa., public schools was
unconstitutional.”372 Judge Jones’s decision had encouraged school board members to
vote against the proposed “critical analysis of evolution,” because it would be “deeply
unfair to the children of this state to mislead them about the nature of science.”373
More recently, a pending 2014 Ohio statute seems to reject Kitzmiller by “pro-
hibit[ing] political or religious interpretation of scientific facts in favor of another.”374
This new law is specifically designed to allow the teaching of “Creationism along
with evolution and global warming denial alongside climate science.”375 As the pend-
ing bill’s sponsors, state legislators Andy Thompson and Matt Huffman recently
365 See infra notes 366–70 and accompanying text.
366 Michael B. Berkman & Eric Plutzer, Defeating Creationism in the Courtroom, but Not









374 Update on Ohio’s Antiscience Bill, NAT’L CTR. FOR SCI. EDUC. (Aug. 20, 2014), http://
ncse.com/news/2014/08/update-ohios-antiscience-bill-0015817 [http://perma.cc/9NXX-AYDC].
375 Id.
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explained, “[W]e want to provide them the flexibility to consider all perspectives,
not just on matters of faith or how the Earth came into existence, but also global
warming and other topics that are controversial.”376
Four years after Kitzmiller, the Texas State Board of Education adopted new
science standards.377 The standards were “written by a group of scientists and edu-
cators,” “the proposal covered evolution fully,” and “[m]ore than 50 science orga-
nizations endorsed the original standards.”378 Recently, “creationists successfully
amended them . . . [to] include loopholes that allow evolution to be attacked and
creationism to be snuck into public school classrooms.”379 Texas standards currently
encourage students to “analyze, evaluate, and critique” scientific theories and require
exposure to “all sides of scientific evidence of those scientific explanations so as to
encourage critical thinking.”380 As then-Governor Rick Perry explained during the
2012 presidential election: “In Texas we teach both creationism and evolution in our
public schools.”381
Texas (like many other states) uses public school dollars to support charter
schools.382 A recent investigative report revealed that Texas charter school students rely
on classroom materials that ignore the scientific evidence.383 For example, Texas school
children use biology textbooks that say “that the fossil record is ‘sketchy[,]’ [t]hat evo-
lution is ‘dogma’ and an ‘unproved theory’ with no experimental basis[, and] . . . that
leading scientists dispute the mechanisms of evolution and the age of the Earth.”384
New state efforts to incorporate “scientific critique” of evolution will also be
couched in the language of academic freedom. In Louisiana, state legislators recently
purported to advance “academic freedom” with a new “Science Education Act,” de-
claring it the right and responsibility of public school teachers to encourage “critical
thinking” by students.385 As of February 2013, eleven similar “academic freedom”
bills aimed at the science classroom had been introduced around the country.386
376 Id.













385 James Gill, Family Forum Ties Itself in Knots Defending Creationist Law, NOLA.COM,
http://www.nola.com/opinions/index.ssf/2013/03/family_forum_ties_itself_in_kn.html [http://
perma.cc/NW4P-4RXL] (last updated Mar. 20, 2013, 7:16 PM).
386 Joshua Youngkin, State of the Union: An Academic Freedom Bill Roundup, EVOLUTION
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In 2014, the American Federation of Teachers (AFT) responded. The AFT reso-
lution, “Against So-Called Academic Freedom Bills that Undermine the Accurate
Teaching of Evolution,”387 seeks to prevent school boards from equating Intelligent
Design with “scientific” theory or critique under the guise of academic freedom by
opposing all new laws that: (1) require teaching “the full range of scientific views
regarding biological and chemical evolution”;388 (2) “offer students ‘protection for
subscribing to a particular position on views regarding biological or chemical
evolution’”;389 (3) purport to “help students develop ‘critical thinking skills’ on ‘con-
troversial issues’”;390 or (4) “direct teachers to discuss ‘the scientific strengths and
scientific weaknesses of existing scientific theories.’”391
B. Recent Anti-Abortion Developments
1. Inaccurate Judicial Fact-Finding About Abortion: Gonzales v. Carhart
Between 1995 and 2003, Congress repeatedly attempted to pass a federal partial-
birth abortion ban.392 The law was finally passed in 2003.393 After signing the bill, Pres-
ident Bush expressed his support: “For years . . . a terrible form of violence has been
directed at children who are inches from birth while the law looked the other way.”394
The 2003 Act, which was found unconstitutional in various federal courts as it
made its way to the Supreme Court,395 was a transparent legislative end run around
Stenberg based on new congressional fact “findings” that the intact dilation and
NEWS & VIEWS (Feb. 11, 2013, 11:23 AM), http://www.evolutionnews.org/2013/02/state_of
_the_un069091.html [http://perma.cc/VR79-HQA8].
387 Against So-Called Academic Freedom Bills That Undermine the Accurate Teaching of





391 Id. (referencing the Louisiana Science Education Act of 2008).
392 See Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 140–41 (2007) (“In 1996, Congress . . . acted
to ban partial-birth abortion. President Clinton vetoed the congressional legislation, and the
Senate failed to override the veto. Congress approved another bill banning the procedure in
1997, but President Clinton again vetoed it. In 2003, after this Court’s decision in Stenberg,
Congress passed the Act at issue here.”).
393 Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-105, 117 Stat. 1201 (2003).
394 Kelefa Sanneh, The Intensity Gap: Can a Pro-life Platform Win Elections?, NEW
YORKER (Oct. 27, 2014), http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2014/10/27/intensity-gap
[http://perma.cc/79FY-BS82].
395 See Barbara Jean Bailey, Congress Ignores the Parameters of the Health Exception,
27 J. LEGAL MED. 71, 77 (2006) (citing Planned Parenthood Federation of America v. Ashcroft,
320 F. Supp. 2d 957 (N.D. Cal. 2004); National Abortion Federation v. Ashcroft, 330 F. Supp.
2d 436 (S.D.N.Y. 2004); and Carhart v. Ashcroft, 331 F. Supp. 2d 805 (D. Neb. 2004) as cases
that “determined the Act to be unconstitutional because of Congress’s fundamental omission”).
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extraction abortion procedure was never medically necessary.396 These included the
findings that,
[r]ather than being an abortion procedure that is embraced by the
medical community, particularly among physicians who routinely
perform other abortion procedures, partial-birth abortion remains
a disfavored procedure that is not only unnecessary to preserve the
health of the mother, but in fact poses serious risks to the long-
term health of women and in some circumstances, their lives.397
In a lengthy statement of medical “facts,” Congress also determined that
[t]here is no credible medical evidence that partial-birth abortions
are safe or are safer than other abortion procedures. No controlled
studies of partial-birth abortions have been conducted nor have
any comparative studies been conducted to demonstrate its safety
and efficacy compared to other abortion methods. Furthermore,
there have been no articles published in peer-reviewed journals
that establish that partial-birth abortions are superior in any way
to established abortion procedures. Indeed, unlike other more
commonly used abortion procedures, there are currently no med-
ical schools that provide instruction on abortions that include the
instruction in partial-birth abortions in their curriculum.398
Senator Barbara Boxer had complained that Congress was not qualified to address
these medical questions.399 She also expressed a more general concern that by en-
acting the first congressional ban on an approved medical procedure,400 the federal
396 Wharton et al., supra note 326, at 347; see also Shannon L. Pedersen, When Congress
Practices Medicine: How Congressional Legislation of Medical Judgment May Infringe a Fun-
damental Right, 24 TOURO L. REV. 791, 819 (2008) (noting that abortion opponents believed
that the new law could survive Stenberg because Congress had “added findings of fact to the
bill stating that the banned procedure was never medically necessary” because “overwhelming
evidence . . . compiled at extensive congressional hearings . . . demonstrates that a partial-birth
abortion is never necessary to preserve the health of a woman, poses significant health risks
to a woman . . . and is outside the standard of medical care” (alterations in original) (quoting
Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act § 2(5), 117 Stat. at 1202)).
397 Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act § 2(2), 117 Stat. at 1201.
398 Id. at § 2(14)(B), 117 Stat. at 1204.
399 Carol Jouzaitis, Senate Bans Late Abortion Procedure, CHI. TRIB. (Dec. 8, 1995), http://
articles.chicagotribune.com/1995-12-08/news/9512080264_1_late-term-abortion-procedure
-partial-birth-abortion-dilation-and-extraction [http://perma.cc/58E5-WPC4].
400 149 CONG. REC. S11589-606, S11597 (2003) (statement of Sen. Barbara Boxer) (“This
is the first time any Congress has ever outlawed a medical procedure that is supported by the
medical community.”).
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government was effectively telling American women that their health does not
matter.401 Other commentators expressed skepticism about the legitimacy and medi-
cal accuracy of the congressional fact-finding inquiry,402 opining that the law was
based on “skewed testimony”403 that ignored empirical evidence indicating that
“ninety-one percent of the doctors with relevant experience in performing abortions
actually oppose[d] the ban.”404
2. Understanding the New Judicial Approach
The Supreme Court granted certiorari in Gonzales v. Carhart on February 21,
2006, which was Justice Alito’s first day on the bench.405 Oral argument was held on
November 8, 2006. Starting with Justice Breyer’s first question to Solicitor General
Paul Clement, the focus of the Court’s inquiry was, once again, on the medical
details.406 Justice Breyer asked complex questions about the potential impact of
“prior surgery [and] pelvic inflammatory disease,” and Justice Kennedy pondered
the complications that might ensue if “the uterine wall is compromised by cancer or
some forms of preeclampsia.”407
These medical questions were likely drawn from the amicus briefs filed by a
range of professional medical associations, including the American College of Obste-
tricians and Gynecologists,408 California Medical Association,409 and the Institute
for Reproductive Health Access.410 For example, the American Medical Women’s
401 Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Ready for Vote, WASH. TIMES (Sept. 30, 2003), http://www
.washingtontimes.com/news/2003/sep/30/20030930-113018-1410r/?page=all [http://perma
.cc/T34Q-J298].
402 Ames Grawert, The Fundamental Meaning of “Medical Uncertainty”: Judicial Def-
erence to Selective Science in Gonzales v. Carhart, 12 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 379,
383–84 (2009).
403 Id. at 384.
404 Id.
405 Gonzales v. Carhart, 413 F.3d 791 (8th Cir. 2005), cert. granted, 546 U.S. 1169 (2006).
406 Transcript of Oral Argument at 4:5–15, Gonzales v. Planned Parenthood Fed’n of Am.,
Inc., 547 U.S. 1205 (2006) (No. 05-1382) (“But the problem with this is that there—well,
some doctors absolutely agree. . . . [There] is doctor after doctor who takes the other position,
and they say: Look, all that we’re doing here is trying to remove the fetus in a single pass . . .
and the reason we’re trying to do that is if we don’t, there may be bone fragments left inside
the womb.”).
407 Id. at 7:19–20, 12:22–23.
408 Brief of the Am. Coll. of Obstetricians & Gynecologists as Amicus Curiae Supporting
Respondents, Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124 (2007) (Nos. 05-380, 1382), 2006 WL
2867888.
409 Brief of Cal. Med. Ass’n as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondents, Gonzales, 547
U.S. 1205 (No. 05-1382), 2006 WL 2725689.
410 Brief of the Inst. for Reprod. Health Access et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of
Respondents, Gonzales, 547 U.S. 1205 (Nos. 05-380, 1382), 2006 WL 2736633.
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Association and the American Public Health Association had argued to the Court as
amici that the Stenberg Court had accurately evaluated the empirical evidence and
“correctly recognized that an intact approach to D&E offers safety advantages for
women.”411 The federal ban, according to these amici, was a thinly disguised
attempt[ ] to justify a ban on safe abortion procedures by impos-
ing an artificial and unrealistic standard for judging safety that the
surgical community does not impose on itself, and that as a prac-
tical matter can never be the sole standard by which surgeons
judge the safety and health benefits of new procedures.412
The Court should recognize that disregarding the medical evidence to ban an approved
and safe procedure “unquestionably jeopardizes women’s health, with a veiled pre-
tense of concern for safety.”413
On April 18, 2007, the Supreme Court upheld the federal Partial-Birth Abortion
Act.414 Abortion opponents immediately heralded Gonzales v. Carhart as a victory,415
believing that, after thirty years, the Court was finally dismantling the remain-
ing abortion safeguards.416 Many popular commentators entered the political fray as
411 Brief of the Am. Med. Women’s Ass’n et al. at 21, Gonzales, 547 U.S. 1205 (No. 05-
1382), 2006 WL 273663.
412 Id. at 18.
413 Id. at 20.
414 Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124 (2007).
415 For example, the National Review responded as follows:
Wednesday’s Gonzales v. Carhart decision upholding the federal partial-
birth-abortion ban has been well received by pro-lifers. Indeed, the
Judiciary has been a consistent thorn in the side of the pro-life move-
ment and Supreme Court decisions that uphold pro-life laws should right-
fully be applauded. More importantly, this decision demonstrates that
the incremental strategy pursued by the pro-life movement continues
to pay some real dividends. The ruling is a good indication pro-lifers
would do well to continue this strategy of incrementalism in the future.
Michael J. New, The I’s Have It: Three Cheers for Pro-life Incrementalism, NAT’L REV.
(Apr. 19, 2007, 6:30 AM), http://www.nationalreview.com/article/220661/have-it-michael-j
-new [http://perma.cc/WFZ5-4W8C].
416 The following public statement was issued on behalf of the Center for Reproductive
Rights:
[W]e should assume that this is only the beginning. The Justices have
shown their cards. Despite assurances that they would uphold prece-
dents, the Court has now kicked open the door for states to impose
broader restrictions on Roe, restrictions that will sacrifice women’s
health for the sake of ideological gains.
Roberts Court Shows Its Cards: In a Stunning Reversal, Supreme Court Rules Against
Women’s Health, in Favor of Abortion Restriction, CTR. FOR REPROD. RTS. (Apr. 18, 2007),
http://reproductiverights.org/press-room/roberts-court-shows-its-cards-in-a-stunning-reversal
-supreme-court-rules-against-womens-h [http://perma.cc/K7BV-NM2E].
2015] EXTRALEGAL SUPREME COURT POLICY-MAKING 507
self-proclaimed pro-choice or anti-abortion advocates. Others highlighted questions
of judicial integrity by focusing on whether the newest members of the Court, Chief
Justice Roberts and Justice Alito,417 had falsely sworn during their recent confirma-
tion hearings to uphold precedent and employ principles of stare decisis.418
a. The Medical Evidence
Justice Kennedy’s decision for the Gonzales v. Carhart majority began with
detailed medical fact-finding:
The woman is placed under general anesthesia or conscious
sedation. The doctor, often guided by ultrasound, inserts grasping
forceps through the woman’s cervix and into the uterus to grab
the fetus. The doctor grips a fetal part with the forceps and pulls
it back through the cervix and vagina, continuing to pull even after
meeting resistance from the cervix. The friction causes the fetus
to tear apart. For example, a leg might be ripped off the fetus as it
417 At the time of his confirmation, then-Judge Alito devoted a significant amount of time
to principles of stare decisis. In fact,
[h]is testimony opened with a long colloquy between him and Sen.
Specter about Casey, its discussion of stare decisis and how that applies
to the right to choose. Justice Alito, as he did throughout his testimony,
carefully addressed the importance of precedent, but he consistently
refused to discuss how the principles actually applied to a consideration
of [the right at issue].
See Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of Samuel A. Alito, Jr. to Be an Associate Justice
of the Supreme Court of the United States: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary,
109th Cong. 943 (Jan. 9–13, 2006).
418 The fact that Justice Alito had joined the Gonzales v. Carhart majority was not a sur-
prise. Prior to his confirmation, the Center for Reproductive Rights had issued the following
objection to his nomination:
While the Center does not normally take positions on judicial nomi-
nations, our review of Judge Alito’s record and testimony has spurred
us to submit this written testimony to express our grave concern over the
impact Judge Alito would have on reproductive rights jurisprudence as
an Associate Justice of the United States Supreme Court. Of particular
concern are 1) Judge Alito’s repeated refusal to discuss whether he still
holds the view, as he expressed in his 1985 job application, that “the
Constitution does not protect a right to an abortion”; 2) his refusal to
agree that Roe v. Wade is “settled law”; and 3) his failure to explain sat-
isfactorily his dissent in the Third Circuit’s decision in Planned Parent-
hood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey. . . . Moreover, his testimony
that Roe v. Wade is a precedent that is entitled to respect under the doc-
trine of stare decisis coupled with his refusal to state that Roe is “settled
law,” does not allay our concerns.
Id. at 937.
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is pulled through the cervix and out of the woman. The process of
evacuating the fetus piece by piece continues until it has been
completely removed. A doctor may make 10 to 15 passes with the
forceps to evacuate the fetus in its entirety . . . .419
The majority’s fact-finding echoed the congressional review of the medical evidence.
In fact, Justice Kennedy explicitly stated that the Court’s principal basis for distinguish-
ing Stenberg was that Congress had found that “[a] moral, medical, and ethical con-
sensus exists that the practice of performing a partial-birth abortion . . . is a gruesome
and inhumane procedure that is never medically necessary and should be prohibited.”420
Justice Ginsburg, writing for Justices Stevens, Souter, and Breyer, issued a pow-
erful dissent. Referring to the decision as “alarming,” she faulted the majority for:
(1) “refus[ing] to take Casey and Stenberg seriously”;421 (2) “blur[ring] the line, firmly
drawn in Casey, between previability and postviability abortions”;422 and (3) “for the
first time since Roe, . . . bless[ing] a prohibition with no exception safeguarding a
woman’s health.”423 The dissenters also attacked the Court’s blind obeisance to
“[t]he congressional findings on which the Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act rests.”424
The Court’s fact-finding ignored the “thoroughgoing review of the trial evidence
and the congressional record, [conducted by] each of the District Courts to consider
the issue,”425 and the fact that every lower court had “rejected Congress’s findings
as unreasonable and not supported by the evidence.”426
Justice Ginsburg also faulted the majority for fact-finding based on unreliable
scientific theories from non-experts: “[N]one of the six physicians who testified before
Congress had ever performed an intact D&E. Several did not provide abortion services
at all; and one was not even an obgyn.”427 On complex questions of medical fact, the
Court was mistakenly relying on congressional testimony from doctors who admitted
to having “no (or very little) recent and relevant experience with surgical abortions,
and disregarded the views of doctors who had significant and relevant experience with
those procedures”428 and rejecting the trial testimony of “‘numerous’ ‘extraordi-
narily accomplished’ and ‘very experienced’ medical experts [who] explained that,
in certain circumstances and for certain women, intact D&E is safer than alternative
procedures and necessary to protect women’s health.”429
419 Gonzales, 550 U.S. at 135–36.
420 Id. at 141 (alterations in original).
421 Id. at 170 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
422 Id. at 171.
423 Id.
424 Id. at 174–75.
425 Id. at 178–79.
426 Id.
427 Id. at 175 (alteration in original) (quoting Planned Parenthood Fed’n of Am. v. Ashcroft,
320 F. Supp. 2d 957, 1019 (N.D. Cal. 2004)).
428 Id. (quoting Carhart v. Ashcroft, 331 F. Supp. 2d 805, 1011 (D. Neb. 2004)).
429 Id. at 177 (citing Carhart, 331 F. Supp. 2d at 1024–27).
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b. The Psychological Evidence
Justice Kennedy also engaged in fact-finding on the psychological evidence.
Without citing any empirical evidence, the majority found that it is “self-evident” that
a mother’s mental health will be threatened when she “comes to regret her choice to
abort [and] must struggle with grief . . . anguish[ ] and sorrow.”430 The psychological
harm will be “more profound when she learns, only after the event, what she once did
not know: that she allowed a doctor to pierce the skull and vacuum the fast-developing
brain of her unborn child, a child assuming the human form.”431 Under these circum-
stances, Justice Kennedy assumed, without support, that “[s]evere depression and loss
of esteem can follow.”432
The dissenters’ response to the majority’s unsubstantiated psychological fact-
finding was vitriolic. In Justice Ginsburg’s view, “the Court invoke[d] an antiabortion
shibboleth for which it concededly has no reliable evidence: Women who have abor-
tions come to regret their choices, and consequently suffer from ‘[s]evere depression
and loss of esteem.’”433 In a purported effort to protect “women’s fragile emotional
state,” the majority “deprive[d] women of the right to make an autonomous choice,
even at the expense of their safety.”434 The dissenters specifically objected to the lack
of an evidence base and to the majority’s outdated and gendered approach.435 Just
seven years ago, Casey had confirmed that “[t]he destiny of the woman must be
shaped . . . on her own conception of her spiritual imperatives and her place in
society.”436 Now, under the guise of a seemingly “scientific theory” regarding men-
tal health, the majority was advancing a “way of thinking [which] reflects ancient
notions about women’s place in the family and under the Constitution—ideas that
have long since been discredited.”437
C. Judicial Policy-Making Undermines Science and Science Policy
Linda Greenhouse is undoubtedly correct that “[h]ow the Supreme Court responds
to facts offers a window on the current Court and its Justices.”438 In 2000, when the
430 Id. at 159 (majority opinion).
431 Id. at 160. Perhaps Linda Greenhouse of the New York Times best described the
decision when she wrote that it reflected the Court’s new view that “the procedure itself, not
the pregnancy, threatened a woman’s health—mental health.” Linda Greenhouse, Adjudging
a Moral Harm to Women from Abortions, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 20, 2007), http://www.nytimes
.com/2007/04/20/us/20assess.html?_r=0.
432 Gonzales, 550 U.S. at 159.
433 Id. at 183 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (second alteration in original).
434 Id. at 183–84.
435 See id. at 170–71.
436 Id. at 185 (alterations in original) (quoting Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505
U.S. 833, 852 (1992)).
437 Id. at 185.
438 Linda Greenhouse, The Counter-Factual Court: Brandeis Lecture, Louis D. Brandeis
School of Law, University of Louisville, March 5, 2008, 47 U. LOUISVILLE L. REV. 1, 4 (2008).
510 WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL [Vol. 24:451
Supreme Court decided Stenberg, the Court’s implicit science law message was that
most of the Justices, regardless of their personal views on the ethics of abortion,
would consider the empirical data.439 The Gonzales v. Carhart message is entirely
different. Science in the abortion context may now be supplanted with pseudosci-
entific assumptions from non-expert witnesses and unsubstantiated speculations from
the Justices themselves.440 This blatant epistemic relativism cannot mask the Justices’s
partisan objectives.
Gonzales v. Carhart is also a clear victory for all post-Edwards “scientized”
approaches to public policy debates involving questions of empirical fact. The deci-
sion reveals the power of a “scientized” anti-abortion approach that,
[i]nstead of simply lecturing about the moral evils of abortion, . . .
increasingly depict[s] the procedure as damaging to women’s
health. And on a range of other issues . . . ha[s] similarly adopted
the veneer of scientific and technical expertise instead of merely
asserting their heartfelt beliefs. Their claims [include]—that abor-
tion causes mental problems in women, that condoms aren’t very
effective in preventing HIV and other sexually transmitted dis-
eases, [and] that adult stem cells have more research promise than
embryonic ones . . . .441
Over the past seven years, many commentators have criticized Justice Kennedy’s
paternalistic abortion jurisprudence.442 But the Court’s unscientific approach to ques-
tions of medicine and mental health transcend questions of reproductive rights.443
1. Anticipating Consequences
The Court’s cavalier rejection of empirical information in Gonzales v. Carhart
also supports Linda Greenhouse’s concern that we now have a “counter-factual
Court.”444 Shortly after the case was decided, the New England Journal of Medicine
published a detailed critique of the majority’s willingness to “disregard the health of
439 See Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914, 920–21, 932 (2000).
440 See supra Part IV.B.2.b.
441 Chris Mooney, Research and Destroy: How the Religious Right Promotes Its Own
“Experts” to Combat Mainstream Science, WASH. MONTHLY (Oct. 2004), http://www.wash
ingtonmonthly.com/features/2004/0410.mooney.html [http://perma.cc/4DEF-7AGQ].
442 See, e.g., Elizabeth Kukura, Choice in Birth: Preserving Access to VBAC, 114 PENN
ST. L. REV. 955, 981 (2010) (“Carhart is a devastating decision for advocates of reproductive
freedom because it not only whittles away at the guarantee of health exceptions for the woman,
but it also contains highly paternalistic language about the health and interests of a pregnant
woman seeking an abortion.”).
443 See supra Part IV.B.2.b.
444 Greenhouse, supra note 438, at 20.
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pregnant women and the medical judgment of their physicians.”445 The authors also
complained of barely shielded partisan contempt evidenced by the majority’s repeated
reference to physicians as “unprincipled ‘abortion doctors.’”446 They also critiqued
the majority for “infantilizing pregnant women as incapable of making serious deci-
sions about their lives and health.”447
Inaccurate fact-finding in science-dependent cases alters the scope and operation
of legal standards. In effect, Gonzales v. Carhart redefined the preexisting “signifi-
cant body of medical opinion” standard by deeming it satisfied by the proffered evi-
dence. Because Justice Kennedy freely admitted that the Court could “find no reliable
data to measure the phenomenon” of post-abortion mental trauma,448 his mental health
fact-finding is especially problematic. The majority’s conclusion that a mother will
“come[ ] to regret her choice to abort [and] must struggle with grief . . . anguish[ ]
and sorrow”449 and that “[s]evere depression and loss of esteem can follow”450 were
“self-evident.”451 A self-evident scientific conclusion is—like gravity—widely ac-
cepted and easily tested. It is not—like post-abortion depression—empirically unsup-
portable. Even at the time,
[m]ultiple scientific studies ha[d] rejected the claim that a “post-
abortion syndrome” threatens the mental health of women who
have abortions. A study by the American Psychiatric Associa-
tion reported that seventy-six percent of women report feeling
relief at having terminated an unwanted pregnancy, and concluded
that abortion “does not pose a psychological hazard for most
women.” . . . In fact, . . . “there is evidence that positive psycho-
logical changes occur as a result of abortions,” including “feelings
of increased self-directedness, autonomy, and efficiency.”452
Yet the Court “seemed not to care that medical authority had debunked the theory
of a ‘post-abortion syndrome.’”453
Gonzales v. Carhart provides a worrisome template for future “scientized” abortion
debates inside and outside the courts. As the Alan Guttmacher Institute reported on
February 1, 2015, most current and pending abortion restrictions similarly purport to
address medical concerns and advance maternal health and safety interests by requiring




448 Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 159 (2007).
449 Id.
450 Id.
451 See id. at 185 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
452 Greenhouse, supra note 438, at 13 (footnotes omitted).
453 Borgmann, supra note 298, at 28.
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abortions to be performed: (1) by a licensed physician; (2) in a hospital; (3) with the
involvement of a second physician; or (4) only to protect the woman’s life or health.454
Some states also purport to advance maternal mental health interests by mandating
pre-abortion counseling on the purported link between abortion and breast cancer and
post-abortion trauma.455 To win in the courts, with the media, and with the public after
Gonzales v. Carhart, abortion opponents will continue to focus on the science, to
“talk more narrowly about the unpleasant details of abortion,”456 and to ignore the
overwhelmingly empirical evidence.
CONCLUSION: A BETTER PATH FORWARD
The legacy of the anti-evolution movement is that many current and
future science-based legal controversies will appear to be a battle
of competing scientists.457
A. Four Recent Decision-Making Insights
If you’ve made your way here to the end, it should come as no surprise that there
is no quick fix or simple solution to the problem of inaccurate judicial fact-finding
about the natural world and human behavior. Justices of the Supreme Court have life-
time tenure, expansive authority, unconstrained access to increasingly extensive
amicus filings and the internet, and a firm commitment to opaque and even secret
decision-making. Under these circumstances, only a naïve observer would anticipate
the advent of formal judicial decision-making constraints. Instead, this analysis con-
cludes by practicing what it preaches, using new empirical information from a range
of relevant research fields. In a more perfect world, these innovations could enhance
judicial fact-finding by enlightening the Court regarding decision-making impedi-
ments. In the real world, these fields are more likely to provide ongoing insights for
scholars and commentators.
1. The Role of the Media
When judges engage in extralegal fact-finding, especially when they seek inde-
pendent evidence online or from other media sources, they should better anticipate
misrepresentations of “scientific” information, critique, and debate.
454 State Policies in Brief: An Overview of Abortion Laws, supra note 69.
455 Id.
456 Sanneh, supra note 394.
457 See, e.g., Michael J. Behe, Opinion, Design for Living, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 7, 2005),
http://www.nytimes.com/2005/02/07/opinion/07behe.html (explaining why Intelligent Design
is merely a scientific critique of evolution).
2015] EXTRALEGAL SUPREME COURT POLICY-MAKING 513
The most pervasive media problem is the ubiquitous presentation of “balanced”
views on virtually every question of natural or social science.458 This creates a false
impression of empirical equivalence even when the evidence for one explanation or
theory is overwhelming.
To cite an example from outside the scientific fields discussed herein, child
abuse kills over 1,600 children every year.459 Most child abuse victims are infants
less than one year old, and abusive head trauma inflicted on infants by shaking, or
shaking plus impact injury, is the most common form of fatal child infant abuse.460
There is overwhelming scientific support for the fact that shaking an infant can be
fatal.461 According to the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, “[a]busive head
trauma is the leading cause of physical child abuse deaths in the United States,”462 be-
cause “vigorously shaking a baby can be fatal.”463 The Mayo Clinic defines “Shaken
Baby Syndrome” as “a form of child abuse that can result in permanent brain dam-
age or death,”464 and every international and domestic medical organization that has
issued a formal statement on the topic has emphasized the serious risk of infant brain
trauma or death from shaking.465 However, despite overwhelming scientific support
458 Katrina vanden Heuvel, Opinion, The Distorting Reality of ‘False Balance’ in the Media,
WASH. POST (July 15, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/katrina-vanden
-heuvel-the-distorting-reality-of-false-balance-in-the-media/2014/07/14/6def5706-0b81-11e4
-b8e5-d0de80767fc2_story.html [http://perma.cc/Y7UA-NZDK] (describing the problem of
“[f]alse equivalence in the media—giving equal weight to unsupported or even discredited
claims for the sake of appearing impartial”).
459 U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUM. SERVS., CHILD MALTREATMENT 2013, 54–55 (2013),
http://www.acf.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/cb/cm2013.pdf [http://perma.cc/858Z-S54P].
460 Sabine A. Maguire et al., Estimating the Probability of Abusive Head Trauma: A Pooled
Analysis, 128 PEDIATRICS e550, e551 (2011).
461 Over the past four decades, Abusive Head Trauma/Shaken Baby Syndrome has been well
documented in the peer-reviewed medical literature. The research supporting this diagnosis
includes: (1) two medical treatises; (2) at least fourteen chapters in medical treatises; (3) over
seven hundred peer-reviewed clinical medical articles published by over one thousand medi-
cal authors from at least twenty-eight countries; (4) at least eight systematic reviews of the med-
ical literature; (5) at least fifteen controlled trials; (6) at least fifty comparative cohort studies
or prospective case series; and (7) numerous well-designed retrospective case series/reports
comprising thousands of cases. See Sandeep Narang, A Daubert Analysis of Abusive Head
Trauma/Shaken Baby Syndrome, 11 HOUS. J. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 505, 539–40 (2011).
462 Preventing Abusive Head Trauma in Children, CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL &
PREVENTION, http://www.cdc.gov/violenceprevention/childmaltreatment/abusive-head-trauma
.html [http://perma.cc/E3PB-H7GP] (last updated Aug. 10, 2015).
463 A Journalist’s Guide to Shaken Baby Syndrome: A Preventable Tragedy, CENTERS FOR
DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, http://www.cdc.gov/concussion/pdf/sbs_media_guide
_508_optimized-a.pdf [http://perma.cc/9V79-XBLP].
464 Shaken Baby Syndrome, Definition, MAYO CLINIC (Oct. 18, 2014), http://www.mayo
clinic.org/diseases-conditions/shaken-baby-syndrome/basics/definition/con-20034461 [http://
perma.cc/M4FJ-Q3FP].
465 See ROYAL COLL. PAEDIATRICS & CHILD HEALTH, ABUSIVE HEAD TRAUMA AND THE
EYE IN INFANCY (2013), https://www.rcophth.ac.uk/wp-content/uploads/2014/12/2013-SCI
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and near-consensus in the relevant medical community of pediatric healthcare, the
media frequently mischaracterizes “Shaken Baby Syndrome” as a flawed diagnosis
and a scientific controversy dividing the medical field.466 A similar recent report in
the Columbia Journalism Review addressed the problem of a false scientific media
balance in coverage of climate science.467
-292-ABUSIVE-HEAD-TRAUMA-AND-THE-EYE-FINAL-at-June-2013.pdf [http://perma
.cc/8V6Y-378A]; Abusive Head Trauma (Shaken Baby Syndrome), AM. ACAD. PEDIATRICS,
https://www.aap.org/en-us/about-the-aap/aap-press-room/aap-press-room-media-center
/Pages/Abusive-Head-Trauma-Fact-Sheet.aspx [http://perma.cc/N9A2-UBZW]; Abusive Head
Trauma/Shaken Baby Syndrome—2015, AM. ACAD. OPHTHALMOLOGY (Mar. 2015), http://
www.aao.org/clinical-statement/abusive-head-traumashaken-baby-syndrome--june-2010
[http://perma.cc/69G9-2ZK8]; Sherry Boschert, Recognize the Red Flags of Child Abuse,
AM. C. EMERGENCY PHYSICIANS (Dec. 2011), http://www.acep.org/MobileArticle.aspx?id
=82881& [http://perma.cc/DGU4-WJQB]; Fragile Brain, Handle with Care, WORLD HEALTH
ORG. (May 2009), http://www.who.int/bulletin/volumes/87/5/09-030509/en/ [http://perma
.cc/7LCR-32UJ]; Joint Statement on Shaken Baby Syndrome, CANADIAN PEDIATRIC SOC.
(Sept. 1, 2005), http://www.cps.ca/documents/position/shaken-baby-syndrome [http://perma.cc
/GX4A-ZWY8]; Charles Kodner & Angela Wetherton, Diagnosis and Management of Physical
Abuse in Children, 88 AM. FAM. PHYSICIAN 669, 670 (Nov. 2013), http://www.aafp.org/afp
/2013/1115/p669.html [http://perma.cc/E7WX-4P9F]; Shaken Baby Syndrome, AM. ASS’N
NEUROLOGICAL SURGEONS (Nov. 2005), http://www.aans.org/patient%20information/condi
tions%20and%20treatments/shaken%20baby%20syndrome.aspx; Shaken Baby Syndrome,
AM. ASS’N PEDIATRIC OPHTHALMOLOGY & STRABISMUS, http://www.aapos.org/terms/con
ditions/97 [http://perma.cc /3DW3-KB25] (last updated Nov. 2014).
466 See Deborah Tuerkheimer, Opinion, Anatomy of a Misdiagnosis, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 20,
2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/09/21/opinion/21tuerkheimer.html?_r=l&pagewanted
=print. Professor Findley recently appeared with Ms. Edmunds on a television program hosted
by news journalist Katie Couric to proclaim Ms. Edmunds’s “innocence” and promote the
false AHT/SBS “controversy.” See Katie Couric: Falsely Accused: Innocent Behind Bars
(television broadcast Dec. 10, 2012), http://sexoffenderissues.blogspot.com/2012/12/katie
-couric-falsely-accused-innocent.html [http://perma.cc/QN3Y-UU54]; see also Emily Bazelon,
Shaken, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 6, 2011), http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9904E2DD
1339F935A35751C0A9679D8B63&pagewanted=all&smid=pl-share; Richard Ruelas, New
Doubts in “Shaken Baby” Fatalities, REPUBLIC (Sept. 15, 2012, 10:53 PM), http://www.az
central.com/news/articles/20120904shaken-baby-fatalities-doubts.html [http://perma.cc/P4KW
-XJGJ]; Maia Szalavitz, The Shaky Science of Shaken Baby Syndrome, TIME (Jan. 17, 2012),
http://healthland.time.com/2012/01/17/the-shaky-science-of-shaken-baby-syndrome/ [http://
perma.cc/E9TP-QLR4]. Indeed, several articles have appeared more recently in response to
the Smith dissent. See, e.g., Emily Bazelon, A Vindictive Decision: The Supreme Court Sends
a Grandmother Back to Prison to Teach the 9th Circuit a Lesson, SLATE (Nov. 28, 2011,
4:58 PM), http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/jurisprudence/2011/11/shaken
_baby_syndrome_and_the_supreme_court_.single.html [http://perma.cc/XN4F-NB4H]; A.C.
Thompson & Joseph Shapiro, New Evidence in High Profile Shaken Baby Case, NPR, http://
www.npr.org/2012/03/29/149576627/new-evidence-in-high-profile-shaken-baby-case (last
updated Apr. 17, 2012, 4:31 PM); Carol J. Williams, A Pawn in a Legal Chess Match, L.A.
TIMES (Dec. 16, 2010), http://articles.latimes.com/2010/dec/16/local/la-me-1216-shaken-baby
-verdict-20101216 [http://perma.cc/49HK-9QE2].
467 Robert S. Eshelman, The Danger of Fair and Balanced, 52 COLUM. JOURNALISM REV.
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Journalists who report on science “should treat fringe scientific claims with
considerable skepticism, and find out what major peer-reviewed papers or assess-
ments have to say about them.”468 But because this generally does not occur, judges
should be wary. According to Professor Larsen, when judges supplement the record
with their own independent research, “[i]t is not easy [for them] to evaluate the sig-
nificance of scientific claims, not to mention the validity of methods employed,”469
especially because “[v]ery few members of the judiciary have prior experience in
scientific fields.”470 Well-intentioned journalists suffer from the same deficits. When
reporters fail to investigate the validity and evidence base of competing scientific
claims, it is frequently attributable to the fact that “determining how much weight to
give different sides in a scientific debate requires considerable expertise on the issue
at hand . . . [and] [f]ew journalists have real scientific knowledge.”471 Media misin-
formation is not limited to the internet or even to mainstream media. A 2011 study
of 1,500 medical articles found that journalists generally fail to include information
regarding sources and potential conflicts of interest.472
2. Incomplete Information
Judges should better understand the overt and covert effects of decision-making
based on incomplete information. Most questions of natural and social science re-
quire courts to either accept or reject arguments about causation. In research conducted
by Dr. Frank C. Keil, Director of the Yale Cognition and Development Lab, found
that “[p]eople of all ages tend to be miscalibrated with respect to their explanatory
understandings; that is, they think they understand in far more detail than they really
do how some aspect of the world works or why some pattern in the world exists,”473
and that in order “[t]o assess how well people deal with causal complexity . . . one
must first know when one is in over one’s head.”474
52 (2014), http://www.cjr.org/essay/the_danger_of_fair_and_balance.php?page=all [http://
perma.cc/EG3N-8YK5].
468 Chris Mooney, Blinded by Science: How “Balanced” Coverage Lets the Scientific Fringe
Hijack Reality, DISCOVER MAG.: THE INTERSECTION (Jan. 15, 2010, 9:13 AM), http://blogs
.discovermagazine.com/intersection/2010/01/15/blinded-by-science-how-balanced-coverage
-lets-the-scientific-fringe-hijack-reality/#.VOOFBVPF9XY [http://perma.cc/L8YN-LJMD].
469 Larsen, supra note 17, at 1298.
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471 Mooney, supra note 468.
472 Curtis Brainard, Mixed Grades for Medical Coverage, COLUM. JOURNALISM REV.
(Apr. 22, 2011), http://www.cjr.org/the_observatory/mixed_grades_for_med_coverage.php
?page=all [http://perma.cc/U8BC-BCJ6].
473 Frank C. Keil, Explanation and Understanding, 57 ANN. REV. PSYCHOL. 227 (2006),
http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3034737/.
474 Frank C. Keil, Getting to the Truth: Grounding Incomplete Knowledge, 73 BROOK. L.
REV. 1035, 1037 (2008).
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New cognitive science research suggests that judges, like everyone else, are
ignorant of their own ignorance. When judges engage in decisions about the natural
world or human behavior, they “must have a way of sensing when there are gaps in
one’s knowledge that make one’s understanding so flawed that it is inadequate for
use in a task.”475 Or in the now famous words of Donald Rumsfeld: “As we know,
there are known knowns; there are things we know we know. We also know there are
known unknowns; that is to say, we know there are some things we do not know. But
there are also unknown unknowns—the ones we don’t know we don’t know.”476 If
courts better learn to anticipate unknown unknowns, they should become more skep-
tical about the validity of their assumptions. Judges can also respond to fact-finding
demands proactively by seeking guidance on knowledge gaps. For example, the Jus-
tices and all other federal judges can seek neutral expert assistance under Federal
Rule of Evidence 706.477
3. Logical Fallacies
Judges should prepare to encounter new scientific theories and scientific critiques
that rely on logical fallacies, including exaggerated uncertainty and false dichoto-
mies. According to Professor Ceccarelli, the fallacy of exaggerated uncertainty taints
public debate by suggesting that manufactured controversies have legitimate scien-
tific bona fides.478
Scholars outside the field of rhetorical inquiry who have studied
this tactic have told us a great deal about the use and misuse of
scientific uncertainty in the public sphere. For example, epidemi-
ologist David Michaels details a number of cases where industries
have deployed a strategy he calls “manufacturing uncertainty”
in which “mercenary scientists” are hired to skillfully turn “what
should be a debate over policy into a debate over science.”479
This logical fallacy is routinely deployed to support anti-evolution arguments that
the scientific theory fails to account for species diversification and complexity.480
Similarly, exaggerated uncertainty about maternal medical risks are frequently
475 Id.
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480 See supra Part II.C–D.
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advanced to restrict abortion access. For example, on January 7, 2015, the Fifth Circuit
heard argument on a new Texas statute481 limiting abortions to clinics that conform
to hospital standards.482 According to a joint amicus brief filed by the American
Medical Association and the American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists,
“abortion is a very safe procedure only rarely resulting in hospitalization.”483 Accord-
ingly, this new law depends on the logical fallacy of an exaggerated uncertainty re-
garding the dangers of clinic-based procedures and procedures performed by medical
professionals who lack specific hospital admitting privileges.484
Judges should also seek to avoid the logical trap of the false dichotomy. In anti-
evolution arguments, this fallacy is sometimes described as the “two-model approach.”
The two-model approach posits that critique of one theory serves as proof of a com-
peting theory.485 The false dichotomy presumes the existence of only two possible
explanatory theories.486 It also presumes that scientific theories offer complete and
mutually exclusive explanations of natural phenomena or human behavior.487 It is
a logical fallacy that “bears no relation to scientific reasoning, and stifles scientific
inquiry.”488 Scientific inquiry is not a zero-sum game. The misleading suggestion that
all critique invariably does double duty as proof ignores the possibility of a partial
but accurate explanation and “denies the possibility that empirical observation may
suggest new theories of even greater explanatory force.”489 Data inconsistent with the
current formulation of a scientific theory is just that; in itself, it offers no legitimate
support for any competing explanation.
A false dichotomy is also frequently deployed to advance the argument that
proponents of evolution or reproductive rights are atheists or anti-theists. This ques-
tion has been addressed at great length by Richard Dawkins, among others.490
481 H.B. 2, 83rd Leg., 2d Spec. Sess. (Tex. 2013), https://legiscan.com/TX/text/HB2/id
/872841/Texas-2013-HB2-Enrolled.html [http://perma.cc/Q3VW-WKUD].
482 Jennifer Ludden, U.S. Court Weighs Texas Law’s Burden on Women Seeking Abortions,
NPR, http://www.npr.org/2015/01/07/375396952/u-s-court-weighs-texas-laws-burden-on
-women-seeking-abortions (last updated Jan. 7, 2015, 12:35 PM).
483 Brief of the Am. Coll. of Obstetricians & Gynecologists & Am. Med. Ass’n as Amici
Curiae Supporting Plaintiffs-Appellees-Cross-Appellants, Whole Woman’s Health v. Cole,
790 F.3d 563 (5th Cir. 2015) (No. 14-50928), 2014 WL 6865861, at *12.
484 Michelle Goldberg, The Uncertain Science of Fetal Pain, DAILY BEAST (June 19,
2013, 4:45 AM), http://www.thedailybeast.com/witw/articles/2013/06/19/the-uncertain-science
-of-fetal-pain.html [http://perma.cc/RC7R-MABQ]. On June 5, 2015, the Fifth Circuit upheld
the law. Whole Woman’s Health, 790 F.3d 563.
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The National Academy of Sciences has specifically responded to this false di-
chotomy with a public statement that “science and religion are separate and address
aspects of human understanding in different ways [so] [a]ttempts to pit science and
religion against each other create controversy where none needs to exist.”491 More
recently, the “Clergy Letter Project” has been endorsed by over thirteen thousand
Christian, Jewish, Unitarian, and Buddhist leaders.492 The Clergy Project urges that
the teaching of evolution is consistent with all faiths and urges the rejection of Intel-
ligent Design, which “embrace[s] scientific ignorance and transmit[s] such ignorance
to our children.”493
4. The Science of Science Communication
Research from behavioral economics and communication science also provides
useful new insight into judicial fact-finding on questions of natural phenomena. For
example, in April 2014, Professor Brendan Nyhan published the results of a three-year
study on the effect of providing accurate scientific information to parents who were
deciding whether to vaccinate their children.494 He found that parents who began the
study with mixed or negative feelings toward vaccines and were provided with accu-
rate information about benefits and risk “actually became less likely to say they would
vaccinate a future child after receiving information debunking the myth that vaccines
cause autism.”495 Professor Nyhan’s research suggests that simply providing decision
makers with accurate scientific information may be insufficient to overcome conscious
and unconscious emotional reactions. Judges savvy about this new research might
focus greater attention on the distorting effects of emotional and normative appeals.
Other recent behavioral economics research challenges traditional assumptions
about the influence of accurate scientific information. In a study published in 2014,
Professor Dan Kahan was surprised to find that an accurate understanding of scien-
tific principles was a poor predictor of a person’s beliefs about evolution and natural
selection.496 In this study, “profession of ‘belief in’ evolution ha[d] no correlation with
491 NAT’L ACAD. SCIS. & INST. MED., SCIENCE, EVOLUTION, AND CREATIONISM 12 (2008).
492 Welcome to the Clergy Letter Project, CLERGY LETTER PROJECT, http://www.theclergy
letterproject.org/ [http://perma.cc/P4KA-TY2D].
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Religion and Science, CLERGY LETTER PROJECT, http://www.theclergyletterproject.org/Chris
tian_Clergy/ChrClergyLtr.htm [http://perma.cc/M6X3-FZZ5].
494 Brendan Nyhan, Effective Messages in Vaccine Promotion: A Randomized Trial, 133
PEDIATRICS e835 (2014), http://www.dartmouth.edu/~nyhan/vaccine-misinformation.pdf
[http://perma.cc/56T6-62UX].
495 Brendan Nyhan, Vaccine Opponents Can Be Immune to Education, N.Y. TIMES (May 8,
2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/05/09/upshot/vaccine-opponents-can-be-immune-to
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an understanding of basic evolutionary science.”497 According to Professor Kahan,
“[i]ndividuals who say they ‘believe’ are no more likely than those who say they
‘don’t’ to give the correct responses to questions pertaining to natural selection, ran-
dom mutation, and genetic variance—the core elements of the modern synthesis.”498
In contrast, religious beliefs were a good predictor. In fact, Professor Kahan found
that “belief in evolution between more and less religious people is wider among
people who otherwise show familiarity with math and science.”499 This led him to
conclude that “the problem isn’t a lack of information. . . . In other words, religious
people knew the science; they just weren’t willing to say that they believed in it.”500
Given these new insights into previously unrecognized decision-making impedi-
ments and the information overload of a digital world, judges could become more
sophisticated consumers of information about the natural world and human behavior.
In the prescient words of Stephen Colbert:
Truthiness is tearing apart our country, and I don’t mean the
argument over who came up with the word. I don’t know whether
it’s a new thing, but it’s certainly a current thing, in that it doesn’t
seem to matter what facts are. It used to be, everyone was entitled
to their own opinion, but not their own facts. But that’s not the
case anymore. Facts matter not at all. Perception is everything.501
As scientific-sounding arguments continue to be deployed inside and outside the
courthouse to advance a range of partisan or normative objects, a jurisprudence of
truthiness equating empirical information with belief or speculation damns us to sci-
entific ignorance and engenders legal and public policies based on faith, not facts.
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